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THE PUBLIC CHOICE PROBLEM IN 
CORPORATE LAW: CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AFTER CITIZENS UNITED* 
DAVID G. YOSIFON** 
The Supreme Court recently held in Citizens United v. Federal 
Elections Commission (2010) that the First Amendment forbids 
Congress from restricting the political speech of corporations. While 
corporate theory did little to inform the Court’s thinking in Citizens 
United, this Article argues that the holding in Citizens United requires 
us to rethink corporate theory. The shareholder primacy norm in 
American corporate governance relies on the assumption that 
corporations can be restrained from influencing external governmental 
operations. We can enjoy the efficiencies generated by shareholder 
primacy in corporate governance, mainstream corporate theorists have 
long argued, because we can rely on external regulation to curb or cure 
the excesses that such a framework will predictably visit upon non-
shareholding stakeholders, such as workers, consumers, and 
communities. Citizens United removes this lynchpin from canonical 
justifications for exclusive shareholder orientation in firm governance. 
This Article argues that if we cannot as a matter of constitutional law 
keep corporations out of our democracy, then we must as a matter of 
corporate law have more democracy in our corporations. After 
Citizens United, we must begin to restructure corporate law to require 
boards of directors to actively attend to the interests of multiple 
stakeholders at the level of firm governance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article develops a new argument for why corporate law 
should depart from the shareholder primacy norm which presently 
dominates American corporate governance. I begin by highlighting 
shareholder primacy theory’s reliance on the availability of external 
government regulation to curb corporate exploitation of non-
shareholding stakeholders in corporate enterprise, including workers, 
consumers, and communities. I then argue that the shareholder 
primacy norm itself engenders a public choice problem that makes 
reliance on such external regulation implausible. Profit-seeking 
corporations work to undermine the development of the very 
regulation that shareholder primacy theory charges with curbing 
corporate operations. Because of their capital concentration, limited 
liability, singular focus, and relatively small numbers compared to 
other interest groups, corporations can routinely best other 
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constituencies in the competition for regulatory favor. This public 
choice problem is well recognized within regulatory theory generally, 
but it is under-theorized in corporate law. When forced to confront 
this public choice problem, shareholder primacists usually prescribe 
greater regulation of corporate political activity in order to insulate 
the political process from corporate influence. But the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. Federal Elections 
Commission1 makes clear that the First Amendment precludes such a 
response. 
Confronting this analytic dead end, this Article concludes that 
the only viable response to the public choice problem in corporate 
law is to alter corporate governance law so that firms are not 
managed in the exclusive interests of shareholders, but instead 
operate under a multi-stakeholder regime which requires directors to 
attend directly to the interests of multiple stakeholders at the level of 
firm governance. This Article examines in particular the implications 
of charging firm managers with being fiduciaries of consumers, as the 
interests of consumers as corporate stakeholders is largely 
undeveloped in corporate law scholarship.2 Having reached the 
conclusion that multi-stakeholder corporate governance is necessary, 
the Article then demonstrates that implementing a multi-stakeholder 
regime is feasible and requires little departure from the fundamental 
mechanics of corporate governance already in place under the 
shareholder primacy regime. 
My argument relies on a series of premises with which most 
conservative scholars have long agreed, and which many liberal 
scholars have traditionally resisted, in pursuit of a conclusion that 
many liberal scholars have long sought, and which I will argue 
conservatives scholars can no longer deny. 
I.  THE PUBLIC CHOICE PROBLEM IN CORPORATE LAW 
A. The Shareholder Primacy Norm 
Contemporary corporate theory views the corporation as a 
“nexus-of-contracts” comprised of the various stakeholders in 
corporate enterprise, including shareholders, creditors, workers, and 
 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 876, 880 (2010). 
 2. See generally David Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 253 (2009) (endeavoring to help fill this gap with a broad analysis of the 
consumer interest in contemporary corporate theory and extant corporate law). 
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consumers.3 In the canonical account, firm directors are charged with 
running the firm in the best interests of shareholders not because 
shareholders “own” the corporation, but because shareholder 
primacy in firm governance is the “term” that all of the parties to the 
corporate nexus would agree to if they actually sat around a 
bargaining table and negotiated with each other.4 
Primacy in firm governance provides shareholders the repose 
they need to invest in diverse enterprises in which they will exercise 
no day-to-day control, or even much episodic influence. While 
shareholders thus require the faithful agency of the board of 
directors, other stakeholders are thought to be capable of managing 
their own interests in the corporate enterprise. Workers are present 
on the shop floor and can negotiate their wages and conditions of 
employment with management directly or through labor unions.5 
Consumers are present at the cash register and can directly inspect 
and bargain about the quality of the goods and services they desire, or 
more usually, they can manage their interests simply by accepting or 
rejecting a price stipulated by firm managers.6 
Corporate boards can advance shareholder interests in two 
sometimes-overlapping ways. First, they can strive to increase the 
overall gains to trade among all parties within the corporate nexus. 
Second, they can work to increase the percentage of the shareholders’ 
slice of the pie. All stakeholders potentially gain when directors 
develop organizational efficiencies, but shareholder primacy also 
pushes managers to exploit non-shareholders in pursuit of 
shareholder gains. For example, directors can put downward pressure 
on wages and benefits for corporate employees. Workers, having 
made firm-specific investments of their human capital and having 
 
 3. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 28–30 (2008). 
 4. See id. at 51. There is some academic dispute as to whether contemporary 
American corporate law is rightly described as embracing the shareholder primacy norm. 
See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. 
REV. 163, 166 (2008) (disputing the view that corporate law requires directors to maximize 
shareholder wealth). Here I take as my point of departure the assessment of the most 
prominent apologists for the dominant regime, who are quite certain that shareholder 
primacy is the order of the day. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 53 (“[D]espite 
occasional academic arguments to the contrary, the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm . . . indisputably is the law in the United States.”). 
 5. For authoritative elaborations of this canonical account, see generally 
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3; FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001). 
 6. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 16–17. 
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made community-specific investments in other areas of their lives, 
may find it impossible to punish, or credibly threaten to punish, 
directors for such opportunistic conduct by exiting to other firms or 
labor markets.7 Corporations can also manipulate the design of their 
products or engage in misleading advertising campaigns, distorting 
consumers’ risk perceptions or their evaluation of other product 
attributes. Because American corporations operate in robust 
competitive markets, firms that fail to engage in such opportunistic 
conduct will quickly be ground-under by firms that do so. Indeed, the 
capital markets will tend to favor firms that even accidentally stumble 
into such kinds of practice, as if guided by an invisible hand, even 
where no natural-person managers conspire or intend to do so.8 
Conventional corporate law scholars are aware of the incentive 
that firms have to overreach in their dealings with non-shareholders, 
but they are not quick to find that firms successfully do so. Most 
corporate scholars employ a basic rational actor conception of 
stakeholder behavior. In that model, stakeholders seek to maximize 
their privately ordered preferences by rationally evaluating the 
myriad options available to them in the marketplace and other 
behavioral settings.9 Under the standard account, so long as firms are 
operating in competitive markets, they will be forced to provide the 
best possible quality of work or goods at the best possible prices, 
otherwise workers and consumers will find another nexus with which 
to do business.10 With such a framework in place, employment or 
consumption decisions are easily viewed as the manifestation of 
 
 7. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 50–53 (2006) 
(examining worker vulnerabilities under shareholder primacy). 
 8. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the 
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. 
L. REV. 129, 193–202 (2003) (describing this dynamic as the problem of “power 
economics”). 
 9. For a general overview and critique of the rational actor model, see Jon Hanson & 
David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Analysis on the Human 
Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 144–52 (2004), which analyzes in particular John Bates Clark 
Medal winner David Krep’s explanation and defense of the rational actor; see also Andrea 
M. Matwyshyn, Imagining the Intangible, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 965, 990 (2009) (“Corporate 
law theory has been dominated by paradigms from law and economics. The discussion 
tends to center on wealth maximization by self-interested rational actors . . . .” (citing 
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 410–21 (2002); 
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 37–39)). 
 10. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 4 (arguing that corporations 
succeed “by promising and delivering what . . . people value”); id. at 38 (“The more 
appealing the goods to consumers, the more profit.”). 
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personal preferences, and exploitation or manipulation is rarely 
seen.11 
Nevertheless, if only at the margins, conventional corporate 
theory does recognize that because of their relative power, firms can 
sometimes overreach with respect to non-shareholders by 
manipulating wages, prices, and perceptions. Even where such 
problems emerge, however, the standard account insists that the 
solution does not reside in altering the shareholder primacy norm at 
the heart of firm governance. Instead, firms should be restrained from 
engaging in such exploitative conduct by external governmental 
regulation, such as labor laws, consumer protection statutes, and 
environmental codes.12 The threat of profit-reducing fines or criminal 
punishment will ensure compliance with such a regime, thus 
protecting non-shareholder interests without undermining the 
efficiency of shareholder primacy in firm governance. Whatever the 
social problem intersecting with corporate practice, whether it is 
443,000 consumers killed each year from tobacco products13 or the 
subprime mortgage meltdown and subsequent global economic 
collapse, leading corporate law scholars and jurists insist that the 
troubles not be considered a failure of corporate governance law 
itself, but a failure of external regulation.14 
 
 11. See Yosifon, supra note 2, at 258–61. 
 12. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 72 (“[T]argeted legislative approaches are 
a preferable solution to the externalities created by corporate conduct. General welfare 
laws designed to deter corporate misconduct through criminal and civil sanctions imposed 
on the corporation, its directors, and its senior officers are more efficient than 
stakeholderist tweaking of director fiduciary duties.”); Michael C. Jensen, Value 
Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 7 EUR. FIN. 
MGMT. 297, 309 (2001) (“Resolving externality and monopoly problems is the legitimate 
domain of the government in its rule-setting function.”). 
 13. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years of 
Potential Life Lost, and Productivity Losses—United States, 2000–2004, 57 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1221, 1226–28 (2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/ 
PDF/wk/mm5745.pdf; see also Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism 
Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1467, 1502–32 
(1999) (reviewing studies chronicling consumers’ awareness of the risks of smoking). 
 14. For a recent example, see Chancellor William Chandler’s opinion dismissing a 
recent Citigroup shareholder derivative suit brought in connection with the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis: 
It is understandable that investors, and others, want to find someone to hold 
responsible for these losses, and it is often difficult to distinguish between a desire 
to blame someone and a desire to force those responsible to account for their 
wrongdoing. Our law, fortunately, provides guidance for precisely these situations 
in the form of doctrines governing the duties owed by officers and directors of 
Delaware corporations. This law has been refined over hundreds of years, which 
no doubt included many crises, and we must not let our desire to blame someone 
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This “external regulation” escape hatch is an analytic dead end in 
shareholder primacy theory. Because regulation threatens to diminish 
profits, and because directors are given the fiduciary obligation to 
pursue profits, combating the development and implementation of 
regulation becomes an important aspect of the firm’s work. 
Regulatory institutions are not immune from the influence of the 
firms they are charged with containing on behalf of non-
shareholders.15 
Of course, firms are not alone in working to influence regulatory 
institutions. In the halls of government they encounter the other 
stakeholder groups (e.g., workers, consumers, and communities) that 
corporate law scholars attest need regulatory protection from 
corporate operations. But corporations, in general, enjoy competitive 
advantages over consumers and workers in the competition for 
regulatory favor. As Mancur Olson explained more than forty years 
ago, small groups with narrow interests have a collective action 
advantage over broader groups with more diverse interests.16 The 
former find it easier to organize, agree on strategies, generate 
resources to be deployed in joint activity, and exclude potential free-
riders, than do the latter.17 Shareholders, represented by the 
corporation, enjoy all of these advantages over workers and 
consumers. Corporations, on behalf of shareholders, work alone or in 
 
for our losses make us lose sight of the purpose of our law. Ultimately, the 
discretion granted directors and managers allows them to maximize shareholder 
value in the long term by taking risks without the debilitating fear that they will be 
held personally liable if the company experiences losses. This doctrine also means, 
however, that when the company suffers losses, shareholders may not be able to 
hold the directors personally liable. 
In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del. Ch. 2009); see also 
Stephen Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 970–
72 (2009) (arguing that corporate law was not the cause and does not provide a remedy for 
losses associated with the subprime mortgage meltdown). 
 15. Roberta Romano, a leading proponent of the dominant corporate law paradigm 
and author of The Genius of American Corporate Law, acknowledges the prevalence of 
this corporate practice: “Casual empiricism supports the contention that corporate PACs 
[Political Action Committees] and political expenditures are in fact vehicles for profit 
maximization. Corporate PACs . . . tend to be established when there is a substantial 
connection between government policies and the maintenance of firm profits.” Roberta 
Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 996 (1984). 
There is an extensive literature on capture within regulatory and political theory generally, 
so robust that it is curious to see the central claims of this literature usually unaddressed 
within corporate law scholarship. See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 42–46 
(1996); CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 170–200 (1977); George 
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3–4 (1971). 
 16. See MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 5–52 (1970). 
 17. Id. at 22–36. 
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consort with trade associations in the regulatory arena. Acting 
singularly or together, these firms have one goal: profits.18 Other 
stakeholders are widely dispersed and do not have the kind of 
focused representation that shareholders enjoy in the firm. While 
some workers may enjoy union representation, most do not,19 and 
consumers are completely dispersed. Therefore, it is illogical to 
expect that “regulation” will be able to contain the excesses of the 
shareholder primacy corporation. 
Defenders of shareholder primacy in firm governance rarely 
address the public choice problem directly, but when they do, they 
voice a position similar to that of liberal critics of corporations—they 
claim that the proper response to the problem is to insulate the 
political and regulatory realms from corporate influence.20 But 
conservative and critical corporate scholars have failed to bring 
corporate theory together with free speech analysis and have failed to 
recognize that the First Amendment, and the values it represents, 
forecloses the kind of regulation that would be necessary to insulate 
politics from corporate influence and vindicate shareholder primacy.21 
 
 18. Some commentators have focused on the extent to which corporate political 
activity benefits managers, but “the disciplining power of markets aided by appropriate 
incentive contracts restrains managers from consistently engaging in political activities 
adverse to shareholder interests.” Romano, supra note 15, at 996. 
 19. “In 2007, 15.7 million Americans, 12.1 percent of employed wage and salary 
workers, belonged to labor unions. This reflects a sharp decline from 1983, when 
unionized workers comprised 20.1 percent of the workforce.” Ken Matheny, Catholic 
Social Teaching on Labor and Capital: Some Implications for Labor Law, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. 
LEGAL COMMENT. 1, 1 (2009). 
 20. Roberta Romano considers restricting the political activity of corporations to be a 
“second best” solution to the public choice problem in corporate law, with the first best 
solution being redistribution of corporate regulatory rents through tax and transfer: 
[A recurring critique of corporate political activity] is based upon a claim that 
corporations, representing wealthy individuals, have been able to buy elections 
and to shift government policies to their advantage. . . . [E]ven assuming that the 
analysis is correct, a simpler solution exists—the direct redistribution of income. 
The obvious criticism against such a solution is of a second best sort, that 
redistribution is not politically feasible, and therefore indirect approaches like 
publicly financing campaigns and lowering spending ceilings are necessary. But 
because those alternatives aggravate the incumbency effect, the cure may pose 
more severe problems than the supposed disease. 
Romano, supra note 15, at 999–1000. Romano does not engage the First Amendment 
problems inherent in the restriction of political activity, but focuses instead on the 
incumbency effects of corporate patronage. Id. at 1000. Thus, while she recognizes the 
public choice problem that I describe here, she offers no solution to it. 
 21. For example, Jill Fisch likens the shareholder primacy corporation to the 
Holmesian bad man who, constrained only by the law, pursues profits for shareholders. Jill 
E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on 
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The next sub-section will briefly summarize the ways in which 
firms, working on behalf of shareholders, can suppress the operation 
of the regulatory institutions that corporate theory depends upon to 
protect the interests of non-shareholders. 
B. Regulatory Capture 
Corporations can influence the production and administration of 
law in many ways. Perhaps the most direct way would be for firms to 
purchase influence by paying bribes to policymakers. Such influence 
peddling and purchasing is illegal, but it no doubt happens, especially 
in domestic or international settings where prohibitions against 
bribery are under-enforced.22 Nevertheless, because American 
corporate law does not typically protect corporate directors from 
personal liability for criminal conduct, even where it is undertaken on 
behalf of shareholders, managerial risk-aversion probably dissuades 
firms from regularly pursuing patently criminal routes to legislative 
influence.23 
But finer methods of influence abound. Instead of bribes, firms 
and politicians can engage in explicit or implicit quid pro quo 
arrangements, in which politicians influence legislation, rule-making, 
or enforcement, in exchange for contributions to their campaigns for 
political office. Corporations have sought to make donations directly 
to political parties,24 which deploy their resources on behalf of specific 
candidates. This method of influence is restrained by federal and state 
legislation, which limits the amount of direct campaign contributions 
 
Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1599–1604 (2007). Fisch argues that the 
conception of the “Holmesian bad man” constrained only by the law must be complicated 
by an understanding that the bad man may “attempt to change the law with which he does 
not wish to comply.” Id. at 1610. Fisch then argues that progressive law scholars must look 
outside of corporate law and try to ensure that corporations are more constrained from 
the political process by external regulatory power. See id. at 1603–04. 
 22. See generally David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC 
Disgorgement of Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing 
Proportionality, Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471 (2009) (discussing 
the SEC’s increasing use of disgorgement as a tool to enforce the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act). 
 23. See generally Norwood P. Beveridge, Does the Corporate Director Have a Duty 
Always to Obey the Law?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 729 (1996) (answering yes, for the most 
part). 
 24. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Breaching a Leaking Dam?: Corporate Money and 
Elections, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 91, 92–110 (2009) (summarizing means through which 
corporations have endeavored to influence politics, including donations to political 
parties). 
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that corporations can make,25 but such restrictions are easily evaded 
by firms funneling money to independent organizations which 
themselves make contributions to political parties and specific 
candidates.26 In addition, campaign contribution limits do not reach 
explicit or implicit agreements whereby firms make “donations” from 
the corporate treasury to the politician’s favorite charitable 
institutions, in exchange for favorable legislative consideration. As 
long as such arrangements are implicit, they are limited only by 
corporate law restrictions on charitable giving, which are quite lax.27 
Finally, after Citizens United, which will be discussed infra,28 
corporations are free to expend unlimited resources from their 
corporate treasuries in support of a candidate who is favorable to 
their regulatory needs. 
Bribes, contributions, and expenditures are not the only way that 
corporations influence the regulatory process. In fact, they may turn 
out to be less important than other methods. Like most human 
beings, politicians like to view themselves in affirming ways, as hard-
working, competent, principled, and effective.29 Effectuating 
regulatory policies merely for cash payments, or to maintain the 
salaries and trappings of office, would surely give rise to 
unmanageable cognitive dissonance for most politicians, unless they 
could also plausibly believe that the regulatory regimes they support 
are not just useful to their corporate patrons, but also sound public 
policy. In the sardonic tones of Stephen Bainbridge, “Any sensible 
theory of the relationship between politics and corporate governance 
thus must consider not only naked self-interest, but also the 
possibility that ideology matters, even in the halls of Congress.”30 In 
the same tongue-in-cheek manner, Mark Roe has opined that 
“sometimes the public-policy players have enough slack to be able to 
 
 25. See Gregg D. Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section 527 
Organizations, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1000, 1001–02 (2005). 
 26. See id. (emphasizing the ease with which individuals and organizations are able to 
evade campaign contribution limits by giving money to nominally independent political 
organizations rather than candidates). 
 27. See generally Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 
58 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (2005) (reviewing various methods corporations deploy to 
influence regulatory processes at the local, state, and federal levels). 
 28. See infra text accompanying notes 83–95. 
 29. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 9, at 94–106 (reviewing social science that 
demonstrates widespread, powerful motives that humans have to view themselves and the 
groups with which they are associated in an affirming, approving fashion). 
 30. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 671, 689 (1995). 
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act on their ideological preferences.”31 All parties in the problematic 
system may be operating in good faith, with proper motives, in 
dignified fashion. The public choice problem that I am focusing on 
here is a problem in the dynamics of influence. It does not rely on any 
malicious, smoke-filled-room notion of corruption.32 
A most important arena in which the competition for regulatory 
favor takes place, then, is inside the mind of the policymaker. One of 
the crucial ways that firms gain an advantage in this competition is by 
employing professional lobbyists who have the knowledge, 
experience, and persuasive skills to make the corporate case to 
politicians.33 Without the organizational advantage of the firm, other 
stakeholders—and consumers in particular—cannot produce the 
same kind of systematic, personalized lobbying efforts that firms can 
deploy on behalf of their shareholders.34 It is surely a lot easier for a 
politician to support a proposal that advances the interests of a firm 
that supports her tenure in office when she also has reason to believe 
that the proposal constitutes sound policy. 
In this competition over what constitutes sound public policy in 
the minds of politicians, corporations also benefit from the nearly 
universal cognitive bias that social psychologists refer to as the 
“fundamental attribution error,” or the problem of dispositionism.35 
We humans tend to view our own and other people’s behavior as 
being caused by and reflecting privately held preferences, values, 
 
 31. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2503 (2005). 
 32. Many discussions of corporate influence in government lose credibility when they 
make the unwarranted leap from influence to malevolent or selfish purpose, or corruption. 
See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 965 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (“The unparalleled resources, professional lobbyists, and single minded focus 
[corporations] bring to this effort, I believe, make quid pro quo corruption and its 
appearance inherently more likely when they (or their conduits or trade groups) spend 
unrestricted sums on elections.”). These arguments lack credibility especially among 
politicians and business persons who see themselves and their cohort as fair-minded, hard-
working, ethically upstanding folks in whose communities the rare abjectly corrupt person 
is despised and considered an outcast just as they are in any other part of society. See 
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 9, at 90–106 (discussing self, group, and system affirmation 
motives). 
 33. See generally Fisch, supra note 27 (emphasizing the role that knowledge and 
expertise on the part of professional lobbyists plays in the development of regulations that 
are favorable to corporate enterprise); Steven Brill, On Sale: Your Government. Why 
Lobbying Is Washington’s Best Bargain, TIME, July 12, 2010, at 28–35 (discussing 
politicians’ reliance on information provided by corporate lobbyists when developing 
regulatory policy). 
 34. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 966 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(“[C]orporations with large war chests to deploy on electioneering may find 
democratically elected bodies becoming much more attuned to their interests.”). 
 35. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 9, at 6–9, 22–34. 
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desires, and interests.36 This basic picture of human behavior is 
echoed in formal and informal versions of the “rational actor” model 
that animate a great deal of legal scholarship, and corporate theory in 
particular.37 Social psychologists call this cognitive baseline 
dispositionism because it is an outlook that overstates the influence of 
individual disposition in accounting for human behavior and misses 
the crucial role of situation, or behavioral context, in shaping human 
thoughts, preferences, choices, and conduct.38 In their marketing and 
promotional activity, corporations betray a keen understanding of the 
situational nature of human behavior and a willingness to exploit it.39 
In their lobbying efforts, however, corporations regularly promote the 
dispositionist conception of human behavior that policymakers, being 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. See id. at 8–20, 138–70. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Examples of this kind of manipulation abound. It was seen where cigarette 
manufacturers cultivated strains of tobacco with higher levels of nicotine, the addictive 
compound in cigarettes, which influenced the conduct of smokers in ways that were 
opaque to their conscious awareness. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking 
Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
1420, 1475–78 (1999). It is seen also in the promotional practice of retail “junk food” 
(defined as “[a]ny of various prepackaged snack foods high in calories but low in 
nutritional value,” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 440 
(1995)). Walking through any mall, one inevitably encounters the wafting smells and 
calculated visual display of junk food. The human eating system, unbeknownst to our 
conscious understanding, triggers the subjective experience of hunger not only when our 
bodies need energy to complete present life tasks, but also when the body anticipates 
eating or when we are in the presence of food. See David G. Yosifon, Legal Theoretic 
Inadequacy and Obesity Epidemic Analysis, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 681, 686 (2008). The 
mechanics of this system evolved over the eons of human history in which they provided a 
survival advantage, given that food scarcity and famine was then a chronic condition. Id. at 
686–87. Then and now, however, when the situation induces within us the experience of 
hunger, we subjectively conclude that we need to eat now, and when we then patronize the 
salty, fatty foods in our midst we interpret the firms we buy from as having satisfied 
preferences we brought to them, rather than preferences they induced. Id. Other kinds of 
situational manipulation involve the use of advertising to, among other things, lower the 
risk assessments that consumers make regarding specific products. Social psychologists 
have well documented, for example, that in most informal settings humans make 
probability assessments not through any formal actuarial analysis, but based instead on the 
ease with which images or associations of an outcome emerges in the mind. See generally 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and 
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973) (presenting seminal studies identifying 
this cognitive phenomena). What comes to mind is often a function of what is in the 
situation when we make our assessments. In light of this cognitive dynamic, it should not 
be surprising that junk food advertising ubiquitously associates the consumption of junk 
food with health and happiness, sexual virility, and magic, and that consumers 
dramatically underestimate the adverse health risks associated with the regular 
consumption of these foods. Yosifon, supra, at 687. 
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human, are already primed to see.40 It is this conception of human 
behavior which tends to view employee or consumer behavior as the 
manifestation of individual choice, rather than the result of situational 
manipulation.41 And it is this view which suggests that contracts—
privately ordered choices—are sufficient to protect the interests of 
non-shareholders in the corporate nexus, with no need for intrusive 
regulation.42 In the regulatory competition over the conception of 
human agency, then, the playing field is not level. Humans begin with 
a dispositionist baseline, and firms work to promote and deepen it.43 
 
 40. See Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1645, 1769–1801 (2004) (reviewing dispositionism in policymaking generally 
and with respect to the regulatory response to the obesity epidemic in particular). 
 41. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 8, at 225–29. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Cf. Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of 
Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 46 (1988) (“[Public choice theory] implies not 
only that certain sorts of groups are more effective in obtaining desirable legislation, but 
also that certain sorts of issues will be most attractive to entrepreneurial politicians.”). The 
modern literature on public choice places great emphasis on the politician as 
entrepreneur. Id. (“[C]ontrary to popular belief, the public choice model is, in fact, 
inconsistent with the rather primitive ‘capture theory’ of economic regulation which posits 
that one particular interest group rather than a group of interest groups drives legislation 
or regulation.”); see FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT 
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 41 (1997); Fred S. McChesney, Rent 
Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 
101, 102 (1987). Politicians do not just serve the most powerful interests, but rather they 
manufacture support by finding individuals and groups suffering from collective action 
problems and promising to help them achieve unified action. This view does not deny that 
corporations are likely to engage in “socially undesirable rent seeking,” but it simply 
stresses that “legislators, as sellers, play as active a role in the market for legislation as 
potential buyers such as corporations.” Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, 
Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 
1135 (2002). Modern public choice theory also suggests that politicians are likely to 
balance the interests of their non-corporate and corporate constituents by supporting 
ostensibly anti-corporate legislative programs that provide a salient but superficial salve to 
non-corporate agitators, while substantively serving corporate interests. MCCHESNEY, 
supra, at 140–41. Campaign finance legislation, for example, has consistently followed this 
pattern since it first emerged in the early twentieth century—broad public 
pronouncements and salient new regulations, followed by porous enforcement and the 
development of numerous loopholes. Sitkoff, supra, at 1136. Some scholars point to the 
existence of profit-restricting legislation as evidence against the public choice problem I 
am emphasizing. See Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What’s Good for 
General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 235, 247–48 (1988) (arguing that the New Deal, Great Society programs, federal 
regulation of tobacco and pharmaceuticals, and the failure to enact tort reform 
demonstrate that “large corporate interests have not always had their way in the political 
process”). Such legislation, however, only evidences that there is indeed a competition for 
regulatory favor. It does not show that corporations are not generally favored over other 
groups in that competition. Further, where corporate interests do suffer in regulatory 
completion, it is typically at the hands of other organized groups, most notably organized 
YOSIFON.PTD2 5/24/2011  8:35 AM 
1210 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
 
The public choice problem I am emphasizing here has received 
scant attention in leading corporate law scholarship. In his recent 
book-length apologia The New Corporate Governance in Theory and 
Practice, Stephen Bainbridge actually argues that non-shareholding 
stakeholders have an advantage over shareholders in regulatory 
competition: 
Let us assume . . . that nonshareholder constituencies are 
unable to protect themselves through contract. The right rule 
would still be director fiduciary duties incorporating the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm. Many nonshareholder 
constituencies have substantial power to protect themselves 
through the political process. . . . Absent a few self-appointed 
spokesmen [or women], most of whom are either gadflies or 
promoting some service they sell, shareholders—especially 
individuals—have no meaningful political voice. In contrast, 
many nonshareholder constituencies are represented by 
cohesive, politically powerful interest groups.44 
This is clearly wrong. Shareholders presently have the 
magnificently cohesive, relentless, well-funded, and articulate voice of 
the corporation acting as their political voice. The only non-
shareholding group that Bainbridge specifies as having “meaningful 
political voice” are workers through labor unions, which he 
acknowledges do not protect non-union workers, but which is not 
troubling to him because “[v]arious market mechanisms have evolved 
to protect employee investments in firm-specific human capital.”45 
This retreat to the power of the market to protect non-union workers 
is an odd move in an inquiry that promised, pace the block quote 
above, to assume that “nonshareholder constituencies are unable to 
protect themselves through contract.”46 Bainbridge has nothing to say 
about how shareholder primacy theory expects consumers or other 
stakeholders to overcome their collective action problems in the 
regulatory arena where they will face in every corner the elephant of 
the shareholder primacy lobby, which proponents of the dominant 
paradigm appear not to see. 
 
labor—regulatory legislation serving such groups may leave consumers no better off, or 
even worse off, than they are under corporate domination. Finally, even if neither 
corporations nor labor are able to capture the regulatory agenda, that agenda may be 
driven by the ideological interests of individual politicians or political parties. The 
consumer remains in each case an unorganized and ineffective political force. 
 44. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 71. 
 45. Id. at 72. 
 46. Id. at 71. 
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C. Capture of Corporate Law 
Corporate law is often described as essentially “enabling” in that 
it allows parties to contract out of specified arrangements,47 but this 
“enabling” ideology both understates what corporate law does and 
exaggerates what corporate law makes possible. There is stickiness to 
the default once it is prescribed. Even if corporate law is theoretically 
mutable, most parties to the corporate contract encounter severe 
collective action problems which preclude the realization of 
alternative arrangements.48 Non-shareholding stakeholders are 
therefore largely stuck with shareholder primacy in firm governance, 
unless corporate law prescribes some other default.49 
If the default rules are largely determinative, then it is important 
to assess how the defaults are determined. Corporate charters are 
provided, in exchange for a franchise fee, by state governments. 
Competition for investors forces firms to incorporate in states that 
provide a body of corporate law which is most advantageous to 
shareholders.50 The dominant purveyor of corporate law is the state of 
 
 47. See, e.g., Harry G. Hutchison, Choice, Progressive Values, and Corporate Law: A 
Reply to Greenfield, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 437, 449 (2010) (“Corporate law furnishes ‘off-
the-rack’ rules that are primarily enabling (rather than prescriptive) and which allow the 
parties to easily negotiate around them.”); Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a 
Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 212, 
216 (2005) (“State corporate law is in essence enabling, following a menu approach that 
permits firms to alter statutory defaults to fit their needs.”); see also Bernard S. Black, Is 
Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 545–
46 (1990) (analyzing the tension between enabling and mandatory elements in American 
corporate law). 
 48. See OLSON, supra note 16, at 5–52. 
 49. For an excellent example of the infelicitous operation of the status quo bias and 
endowment effects, consider the following insightful study on the structure of employee 
compensation. James Choi and his co-authors found that where employment 
compensation defaults prescribe all cash salaries with an option to mute the default and 
take instead a mix of cash and retirement benefits, roughly eighty percent of employees 
stuck with all cash salaries. See James J. Choi et al., Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan 
Rules, Participant Choices, and the Path of Least Resistance, 16 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 67, 
79–80 (2002). However, where the default is a mix of cash and retirement benefits, with an 
option to mute the default and take all cash instead, around eighty percent stuck with the 
mix of cash and retirement benefits. Id. The study well demonstrates, in a non-trivial 
setting, the power of default rules. It is widely believed that workers are better off with a 
mix of cash and retirement planning than with cash alone. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard 
H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1159–60 
(2003) (discussing the Choi study and similar studies). Some policymakers thus take from 
the Choi study the lesson that employers should establish a mix of cash and savings as the 
compensation default. See, e.g., id.; see also Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 9, at 39–44 
(discussing endowment effects and framing effects); Yosifon, supra note 39, at 695–713 
(critiquing Sunstein and Thaler). 
 50. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 12–14, 36. 
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Delaware. Mark Roe argues that “the first effect of the franchise tax 
is not just to affect who wins between managers and shareholders, nor 
just to bond Delaware to try hard to make good corporate law, but 
also to decide who gets to play. Managers and shareholders get to 
play; no one else does.”51 Non-shareholding stakeholders have a 
particularly hard time being heard in Delaware, which has no 
significant labor base or interest group presence, especially as 
compared to what would be seen in Washington, D.C., if corporations 
were federally chartered.52 No jurisdiction or law-producing body has 
developed an institutional expertise, a tradition, a set of norms, or an 
occasion of regulatory attention for consumers or labor, that can 
match what shareholders enjoy in Delaware. Indeed, in Delaware it 
appears as if there is something going on that looks a lot like a real 
version of the nexus-of-contract theory’s hypothetical conference 
room.53 Delaware is a real corporate law conference room (or state) 
from which non-shareholding stakeholders individually and as a 
group are absent.54 
II.  FIRST AMENDMENT IMPEDIMENTS TO SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
Corporate law discourse typically ignores the public choice 
problem that I have described here. Where scholars do address the 
problem directly, they tend to assume that a plausible solution would 
be to insulate regulatory institutions from corporate influence by 
restricting corporate political activity. For example, Robert Reich, an 
economist and former secretary of labor in the Clinton 
administration, argues that corporations should give up on political 
activity altogether, or be made to: 
 
 51. Roe, supra note 31, at 2500. 
 52. Because of the status quo bias, anchoring effects, framing effects, and institutional 
inertia, it is difficult for Congress to dislodge the presumptions that are established in 
Delaware. Further, while shareholders and managers are exclusively present in Delaware, 
they are also present, independently or collectively in the form of the corporation, in 
Washington, D.C., where they can exercise influence to forestall any overturning of the 
mutually beneficial compromise established in Delaware. See id. at 2517 (“Only when 
overwhelming force—a major scandal or economic reversal—seriously (and usually 
temporarily) empowers either the productivity-oriented policymakers or the populists, or 
both, do the federal authorities act.”). 
 53. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 51. 
 54. See Roe, supra note 31, at 2512 (“It’s as if Delaware gave managers and investors 
the means to caucus quickly and set a status quo.”); id. at 2537 (“Investors, managers, and 
their lawyers are represented on the bar association’s corporate committees; and 
Delaware’s corporate law is itself a quasi-contract between managers and shareholders 
that is written by the two and enforced by the legislature.”). 
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Companies have no independent moral or legal authority to use 
their resources to influence the creation of laws defining their 
responsibilities to stakeholders other than investors. Society has 
ceded to them only the responsibility for maximizing investor 
returns, on the premise that in doing so they will spur growth 
and improve allocative efficiency. . . . The meta-social 
responsibility of the corporation, then, is to respect the political 
process by staying out of it. . . . Should not government enforce 
this meta-responsibility by passing laws and rules which 
constrain corporate political activity?55 
Arguments for the restriction of corporate political activity from 
the corporate law perspective have, however, usually failed to address 
doctrinal or normative limitations that free speech protections place 
on such restrictions. This Part briefly describes the developments of 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on corporate political speech, 
culminating in the recent decision in Citizens United. This Part then 
examines normative arguments for and against limiting corporate 
political speech irrespective of what the Supreme Court has said.56 
This Part concludes with an examination of the limited practicality of 
regulating corporate political activity, regardless of the doctrinal or 
normative legitimacy of such restrictions.57 
A. Getting to Citizens United 
In a landmark article in defense of corporate political speech a 
decade ago, Martin Redish and Howard Wasserman lamented that 
“the modern trend appears unmistakably away from extending full-
fledged constitutional protection to corporate speech.”58 Ten years 
 
 55. Robert B. Reich, The New Meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility, CAL. 
MGMT. REV., Winter 1998, at 8, 16–17. 
 56. My treatment here is limited to an analysis of the viability of various arguments in 
favor or against the regulation of corporate political activity. I use Citizens United as a 
guide to my discussion, but my arguments are both more extensive and more limited than 
what was at stake in that case. I consider broad justifications for the regulation of 
corporate political activity which were not directly or extensively dealt with in the case; on 
the other hand, I do not parse with delicacy the intricacies of the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act (BCRA) regulatory scheme, nor do I parse the labyrinthine questions of how 
well or poorly Citizens United fits with the Court’s previous First Amendment caselaw or 
how well the Court’s work stands up against the principles of stare decisis. For in-depth 
analysis of Citizens United with special attention to the Court’s precedents on corporate 
speech, see generally Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011). 
 57. See infra Part II.D. 
 58. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 43, at 238. 
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ago few would have disagreed with them, but ten years later, the 
Supreme Court has proved them wrong. 
The modern jurisprudence on corporate political speech begins 
in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978),59 which struck 
down on First Amendment grounds (5-4) a Massachusetts statute 
forbidding business corporations from making campaign expenditures 
in referendum elections not “materially affecting any of the property, 
business or assets of the corporation.”60 The statute stipulated that 
referenda on personal income tax rates did not materially affect the 
operation of business corporations or banks (income tax referenda 
were in play in Massachusetts when the statute was passed).61 The 
Bellotti Court did not base its holding on a conclusion about whether 
or not corporations “have” First Amendment rights.62 Instead, the 
Court focused on the nature of the speech that the statute sought to 
forbid and concluded that it was the kind of speech—political speech 
on matters of public importance—that the First Amendment was 
intended to protect.63 Because citizens had a right to, and an interest 
in, hearing speech about public referenda, corporate speech on such 
matters could not be forbidden.64 
In 1986 in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens 
for Life (MCFL),65 the Court (the whole Court, 9-0) struck down, as 
applied to non-profit corporations, a federal statute that tried to 
forbid corporate expenditures in connection with any federal election. 
MCFL was a non-profit corporation dedicated to opposing abortion 
through political advocacy. The Court focused on the fact that MCFL 
was not a business entity66: “Some corporations have features more 
akin to voluntary political associations than business firms, and 
therefore should not have to bear burdens on independent spending 
solely because of their incorporated status.”67 The MCFL Court ruled 
only that the statute at issue could not be applied to non-business 
associations formed for the purpose of engaging in political activity, 
and which did not accept contributions from business enterprises.68 
 
 59. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 60. Id. at 768. Corporate expenditures in opposition to previous tax hike referenda 
had spurred the speech prohibition at issue in the case. Id. at 769. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 775–76. 
 63. Id. at 776. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
 66. Id. at 263. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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Four years later in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of 
Commerce,69 the Court (6-3) made good on the distinction it presaged 
in MCFL when it let stand a state statute forbidding corporations 
from spending money from the corporate treasury “in support of, or 
in opposition to, any candidate in elections for state office.”70 The 
statute did allow the use of segregated funds that were comprised of 
contributions by executives or individual stockholders, but the 
corporation could not spend its own money on campaigns.71 Justice 
Thurgood Marshall wrote for the majority that it was permissible for 
states to regulate corporate speech in the interest of stemming “the 
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth 
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that 
have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the 
corporation’s political ideas.”72 Like MCFL,73 the Michigan Chamber 
of Commerce was a non-profit corporation, but unlike MCFL, it was 
funded by for-profit corporations and was primarily concerned with 
advancing the business prospects of its members.74 Whatever one 
thinks of the merits of the cases, it seems clear that Austin was at least 
in tension with Bellotti, although the two could be distinguished on 
the grounds that Bellotti only addressed corporate speech on 
referendum campaigns, while Austin dealt with corporate speech on 
behalf of or against specific candidates for office.75 
In 2002 Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(BCRA) (also known as the McCain-Feingold law), which, inter alia, 
forbade corporations (both for-profit and non-profit) and labor 
unions from making expenditures or broadcasting ads in support of or 
against specific candidates for political office within thirty days of a 
primary election or sixty days of a general election.76 The legislation 
did not limit campaign expenditures by natural persons.77 
In 2007, in another 5-4 ruling, the Court in Federal Election 
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL)78 turned to 
 
 69. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 70. Id. at 654. 
 71. Id. at 655. On the limited viability of the segregated-fund gambit, see infra note 
95. 
 72. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
 73. See supra text accompanying note 66. 
 74. Austin, 494 U.S. at 656. 
 75. Id. at 654; First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978). 
 76. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, §§ 201, 203, 116 
Stat. 81, 88–89, 91 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f)(3)(A), 441b(b)(2) (2006)), invalidated by 
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 77. § 203(c)(2), 116 Stat. at 91. 
 78. 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
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BCRA’s expenditure prohibition and held that while it was 
permissible for Congress to limit corporate expenditures expressly 
advocating a specific candidate, the First Amendment protected 
expenditures discussing, supporting, or opposing an “issue” that 
might be at stake in a given campaign for a specific office.79 The Court 
upheld BCRA by reading the legislation to prohibit only 
expenditures which used “magic words” of express advocacy or 
opposition to a specific candidate, or words that were the functional 
equivalent of such express advocacy.80 Chief Justice Roberts 
summarized the Court’s opinion as holding that the BRCA forbade 
only speech that is “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other 
than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”81 
Extending the baseball cant he showcased in his “calling balls and 
strikes” explanation of judicial decision-making during his Senate 
confirmation hearings, Roberts wrote that when construing whether 
speech was express advocacy or not, “a tie goes to the speaker.”82 
In September of 2009 the Supreme Court reviewed the BCRA 
again in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.83 Citizens 
United was a non-profit corporation that was funded in part by for-
profit corporations.84 The case concerned a feature-length film that 
the organization produced called Hillary: The Movie, which was 
critical of the political career of Hillary Rodham Clinton, who was 
 
 79. Id. at 470 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 80. WRTL, 551 U.S. at 469–70. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: 
The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. 
REV. 1064 (2008) (critiquing the Roberts Court’s emerging jurisprudence on campaign 
finance regulation). 
 81. WRTL, 551 U.S. at 470. Hasen predicted at the time that “[t]he new test will not 
pose a formidable obstacle for those corporations and unions that wish to run ads to 
influence elections, though it could potentially deter some spending on the most personal 
of attack ads. As a result, a significant rise in corporate election-related spending may 
occur.” Hasen, supra note 80, at 1066. 
 82. WRTL, 551 U.S. at 474 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see Douglas E. Abrams, Sports 
in the Courts: The Role of Sports References in Judicial Opinions, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. 
L.J. 1, 45 & n.241 (2010) (discussing Roberts’s “balls and strikes” comments). In baseball a 
“tie goes to the runner” when the ball and the runner reach the base at the same time. 
Although every sandlot baseball or backyard wiffle ball player knows this rule, it is 
actually a common law rule in baseball, as it appears nowhere in the game’s official 
rulebook, which does not address the situation of “ties.” See Steve Gilbert, Baseball 
Rulebook Not Short on Nuance, MLB.COM (Nov. 16, 2006), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/ 
article.jsp?ymd=20061117&content_id=1742331&vkey=news_ari&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb. 
With this example in mind, the judge-as-umpire analogy should be of limited comfort to 
those who would have judges merely apply the law as written. 
 83. 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010). 
 84. Id. at 886–87. 
YOSIFON.PTD2 5/24/2011  8:35 AM 
2011] CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 1217 
 
then a senator of New York.85 Citizens United wanted to show its film 
in theaters and make it available “on-demand” through cable 
television within thirty days of a primary election in which Senator 
Clinton was running to become the Democratic Party’s candidate for 
president.86 Fearing that their plans would leave them vulnerable to 
civil and criminal penalties under BCRA, Citizens United sought a 
declaratory judgment that BCRA could not legally be applied to 
them.87 A three-judge district court panel held that the content of the 
film was susceptible to no reasonable interpretation other than as 
opposition to Clinton’s candidacy, and thus, under the teaching of 
WRTL, was subject to BCRA’s restrictions.88 
The Supreme Court first heard oral arguments in Citizens United 
in March of 2009 which focused on an “as applied” challenge to 
BCRA.89 In June the Court shocked the legal world by requesting 
additional briefing and a new oral argument on whether the Court 
should address the broader question of the facial constitutional 
legitimacy of the statute.90 The Court itself answered this question in 
the affirmative when its decision finally came down in January of 
2010. In a 5-4 ruling, the Court overruled Austin and held that the 
First Amendment forbids Congress from limiting independent 
expenditures by both non-profit and for-profit corporations in 
connection with campaigns for political office.91 
One of the truly remarkable aspects of the Citizens United 
opinion is the absence of any critical inquiry by the Court into what a 
“corporation” is. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy 
and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Alito, took as its point of departure the idea that the First 
Amendment forbids Congress from regulating political speech based 
on the identity of the speaker, be that speaker a single natural person, 
 
 85. Id. at 887. 
 86. Id. at 887–88. 
 87. Id. at 888. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court Gets Ready to Turn on the Corporate 
Fundraising Spigot, SLATE (June 29, 2009), http://www.slate.com/id/2221753/ (“In a 
Supreme Court term that has had its share of surprises, the court saved one of the biggest 
for last. Rather than publish an opinion at the end of the term as expected in an obscure 
campaign finance case, Citizens United v. FEC, the court issued a rare order for 
reargument of the case in September . . . [when] the court will consider whether to 
overrule its two previous decisions that . . . upheld limits on corporate spending in federal 
elections.”). 
 91. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
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or an association comprised of many persons.92 “The Court has . . . 
rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other 
associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment 
simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’ ”93 
Individuals have First Amendment rights to associative speech, and 
that speech cannot be abridged based on the nature of the 
association; therefore, it was not necessary for the Court to examine 
the nature of the corporate association.94 
Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion similarly glosses over the 
question of what a corporation is, assuming both that it is obvious and 
that it is irrelevant. Citizens United is bereft of any citation to 
corporate theory until, seventy-six pages into his dissent, Justice 
Stevens drops a footnote assuring us that corporate theory is 
irrelevant to his view that corporate political speech can be regulated: 
Nothing in this analysis turns on whether the corporation is 
conceptualized as a grantee of a state concession, see, e.g., 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636 
(1819) (Marshall, C. J.), a nexus of explicit and implicit 
contracts, see, e.g., F. Easterbrook & D. Fischel, The Economic 
Structure of Corporate Law 12 (1991), a mediated hierarchy of 
stakeholders, see, e.g., Blair & Stout, A Team Production 
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247 (1999) 
(hereinafter Blair & Stout), or any other recognized model. . . . 
It is not necessary to agree on a precise theory of the 
corporation to agree that corporations differ from natural 
persons in fundamental ways, and that a legislature might 
therefore need to regulate them differently if it is human 
welfare that is the object of its concern. Cf. Hansmann & 
Kraakman[, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L. 
J. 439 (2001)] 441, n.5.95 
 
 92. Id. at 900. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 898–99, 913. 
 95. Id. at 971–72 n.72 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Stevens claims that his 
arguments are applicable no matter what conception of the corporation one embraces. See 
id. But it is clear through much of his dissent that Stevens does have in mind a particular 
conception of the corporation, and that many of his arguments depend upon the 
conception he is deploying. For example, he insists that corporations are not “banned” 
from engaging in political speech because they may make use of Political Action 
Committees (PACs), which he insists “provide corporations . . . with a constitutionally 
sufficient opportunity to engage in express advocacy.” Id. at 942 (quoting McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876). But corporate 
PACs can only solicit donations from shareholders, executives, and their families. See 11 
C.F.R. 114.5(g)(1) (2010) (corporate PAC regulations). The only way that this is even 
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For Stevens in dissent, it is unnecessary to delve into the nature 
of what a corporation is—so long as its structure, wealth, and power 
threatens to distort or corrupt well-functioning political discourse, 
Congress has the power to regulate it. 
Corporate law is thus wholly irrelevant both to the majority and 
the dissent in Citizens United. Nevertheless, since Citizens United 
stands for the proposition that government cannot insulate the 
political arena from the influence of corporations, Citizens United will 
prove quite relevant indeed to corporate law, or at least to normative 
corporate theory. Before turning to these corporate law implications, 
the following sub-sections will take a deeper look at arguments for 
and against the restriction of corporate political activity. The purpose 
of this inquiry is to help determine whether shareholder primacy is 
theoretically coherent because it does make sense to allow 
government to restrict corporate political activity, in which case what 
we have is merely a bad Supreme Court holding in Citizens United, or 
whether shareholder primacy is not even theoretically sound because 
its command for government restriction of corporate political activity 
is truly irreconcilable with free speech values. 
B. Tempting-But-Ultimately-Bad Arguments for Regulating 
Corporate Political Speech 
1.  The State-Conferred Benefits Argument 
Perhaps the most commonly heard justification for why 
corporate political speech can be restricted is that corporations are 
artificial creatures of law, bestowed with favorable attributes by the 
state, and can therefore be subject to regulation by the governments 
that created them and made them powerful in the first place.96 
 
arguably a sufficient mechanism through which corporations can engage in expressive 
advocacy is if you consider the corporation to be an association of shareholders, or 
shareholders and high level executives. But the idea that corporations are the property of 
shareholders, or merely an association of shareholders, is completely rejected in modern 
theories of the corporation, which conceive of the corporation as a nexus of voluntary 
associations comprised of shareholders, creditors, workers, consumers, and communities. 
See supra text accompanying notes 3–4. 
 96. See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First 
Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 641 (1982). Austin 
itself embraced the state-conferred benefits justification. See Austin v. Mich. State 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990) (“Michigan’s regulation aims at a 
different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of 
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form 
and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political 
YOSIFON.PTD2 5/24/2011  8:35 AM 
1220 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
 
For starters, note that this argument flies in the face of 
contemporary theories of the firm, which posit that the corporation is 
not an entity created by the state, but is rather a voluntary association 
of individuals, a nexus-of-contracts.97 Still, let us assume that 
government does bestow concessions upon corporations in the sense 
of providing default rules, including limited liability to shareholders 
for both contract and tort creditors, and recognizing the indefinite life 
of firms with an ability to buy, hold, and sell property. A state-
conferred benefits justification for restricting corporate political 
speech still cannot withstand scrutiny because it would open the door 
to a host of other speech regulation that would surely be 
incommensurate with First Amendment values, if the First 
Amendment is to mean anything at all. As Redish and Wasserman 
argued in their touchstone defense of corporate free speech: 
It is true . . . that corporations possess a number of statutorily 
granted economic advantages that may enable corporations to 
have a competitive edge over other speakers. . . . Similarly, 
inheritance laws ensure that heirs of large estates will retain 
most of the estate’s corpus, capital gains laws economically 
benefit successful investors, and patent laws give investors 
artificially created monopolies, thereby effectively providing all 
three groups with potential economic advantages in the 
expressive marketplace if they choose to exercise them. . . . No 
one, to our knowledge, has seriously suggested that the 
expressive activity of these individuals or organizations can 
constitutionally be curbed as a result of their potential 
economic advantages.98 
One might add to Redish and Wasserman’s list the government-
conferred benefits of individual bankruptcy, the use of the roads, the 
protection of the police, or the availability of courts to redress private 
and public grievances. Few would argue that because the state confers 
these advantages on natural persons the government should be able 
to regulate individuals’ political speech, or that the government could 
condition these benefits on an individuals’ willingness to subject their 
political speech to government regulation. 
Moreover, many media entities are organized as corporations. 
For example, the New York Times, CNN (a subsidiary of Time-
Warner, Inc.), and Fox News (News Corp.) are all publicly traded 
 
ideas.”). Curiously, the majority in Citizens United did not directly address the state-
conferred benefits argument. 
 97. See supra text accompanying notes 3–4. 
 98. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 43, at 284–85 (footnote omitted). 
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corporations. The government-conferred advantage argument would 
allow the state to regulate the political speech of the New York Times 
and like entities.99 Even political organizations, such as the NAACP, 
NOW, and the NRA, are organized as non-profit corporations and 
enjoy state-conferred benefits, including limited liability to members 
for the debts of their organizations, the right to hold and sell 
property, and tax advantages. It would be a very small version—an 
unfamiliar version—of the First Amendment that would sanction the 
regulation of the media and political organizations on the grounds 
that they enjoy the benefits of state-conferred corporate status.100 
In short, if one is unwilling to allow government to regulate the 
speech of individuals and non-profit associations that benefit from 
state-conferred advantages,101 then some other principle must be 
found for justifying the regulation of corporate political speech. 
 
 99. The BCRA purported to exempt “media corporations,” a restraint the Court 
found unavailing. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905. I am not here tracking the particulars 
of the BCRA statute or the Citizens United opinion, but am reviewing the cogency of 
arguments for and against corporate political speech regulation generally. 
 100. One might argue that there is a special protection for “the press” in our 
constitutional “scaffolding,” but the Court has rejected this view doctrinally, id., and 
conceptually the argument provides no way to distinguish regulation of corporate “press” 
speech from other kinds of corporate speech in the era of conglomerate news and 
entertainment industries, and the proliferation of widespread gonzo journalism through 
the Internet. 
 101. If one were willing to grant speech rights only to individuals and not to 
associations, then that would provide a way of restricting corporate political speech. But 
that would be a very narrow view of free speech rights, one which few would countenance. 
As Justice Scalia put it in his Citizens United concurrence: 
All the provisions of the Bill of Rights set forth the rights of individual men and 
women—not, for example, of trees or polar bears. But the individual person’s right 
to speak includes the right to speak in association with other individual persons. 
Surely the dissent does not believe that speech by the Republican Party or the 
Democratic Party can be censored because it is not the speech of “an individual 
American.” It is the speech of many individual Americans, who have associated in 
a common cause, giving the leadership of the party the right to speak on their 
behalf. The association of individuals in a business corporation is no different—or 
at least it cannot be denied the right to speak on the simplistic ground that it is not 
“an individual American.” 
Id. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring). Political action at the organization level is important 
because it can avoid the free-rider problem besetting individual action, i.e., the 
mismatching of individual costs and benefits arising as a consequence of the fact that the 
objects of politics are often public goods. When a group undertakes political activity, the 
costs, as well as benefits, are shared proportionately by all members, and the optimal level 
of action can be achieved. Critics of free speech for corporations would withhold these 
important organizational advantages from corporate associates. See Redish & Wasserman, 
supra note 43, at 237 (“One should view corporate speech, then, as a form of indirect or 
catalytic self-realization, no less valuable than the more obvious and direct modes of self-
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2.  The Distortion Argument 
One of the arguments for the regulation of corporate political 
speech that was countenanced in Austin and rejected by the Court in 
Citizens United is the “anti-distortion” justification.102 The anti-
distortion argument can be understood as a variation on the “state-
conferred benefit” justification. The anti-distortion argument insists 
that corporations, by virtue of their legal status and structure, are 
capable of deploying resources in support of their political positions 
with a force that projects into political discourse an impression of 
support for its views that is greater than the actual sum of support for 
those positions among natural persons in the voting public as a 
whole.103 The disparity between the prominence of the corporation’s 
expressed views and actual support for such views among the people 
distorts political discourse, elections, and governance. 
This is a bad argument for a number of reasons. First, it is hard to 
see, at least from the perspective of shareholder primacy theory, how 
a corporation’s political speech does not accurately reflect support for 
the views it expresses. Corporate law requires firms to pursue 
shareholder value. In contemporary capital markets, shareholders can 
enter and exit firms with the click of a mouse. They invest in firms 
precisely because they believe that directors will be able to 
accomplish shareholder goals more capably than the shareholders 
could if they maintained control of their capital.104 Sometimes that 
directorial accomplishment takes the form of giving the green light to 
 
development, and thus fully consistent with the purposes served by the constitutional 
protection of speech.”). 
 102. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908 (majority opinion). Apparently grasping the 
implausibly of the anti-distortion argument, the government argued for keeping Austin’s 
holding alive but did not rely on the anti-distortion rationale on which Austin rested. “For 
the most part relinquishing the antidistortion rationale, the Government falls back on the 
argument that corporate political speech can be banned in order to prevent corruption or 
its appearance.” Id.; see also id. at 923 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“The Government 
concedes that Austin ‘is not the most lucid opinion,’ yet asks us to reaffirm its holding.” 
(quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205))). 
In his dissent Justice Stevens insists that “anti-distortion” and “anti-corruption” are really 
two sides of the same justificatory coin: “Austin’s antidistortion rationale is itself an 
anticorruption rationale . . . . Understood properly, ‘antidistortion’ is simply a variant on 
the classic governmental interest in protecting against improper influences on 
officeholders that debilitate the democratic process.” Id. at 970 (Stevens, J., concurring 
and dissenting). I break the anti-distortion and anti-corruption arguments into two 
categories for the sake of exposition, but like most of the categories in this sub-section, 
there is obviously considerable overlap between them. 
 103. See Redish & Wasserman, supra note 43, at 264–68 (discussing the “anti-
distortion” argument for the restriction of corporate political speech). 
 104. See id. at 254. 
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a new production line; other times it involves supporting the 
candidacy of a politician who will support a favorable regulatory 
atmosphere for the product. If shareholders do not agree with the 
political positions that are necessary to maximize return on a 
particular investment, they are perfectly free to divest and re-invest in 
a different industry with countervailing political needs, or in a firm in 
the same industry that is determined to carry on its operations with a 
different political strategy.105 Far from a distortion of the political 
views of their shareholders, then, corporate speech would seem to be 
a reliable expression of it. In this sense, it is certainly true that 
successful corporations concentrate the political voice of their 
shareholders, but it does not distort their voices. 
This same dynamic is witnessed in the context of non-profit 
corporations and political associations. Individuals turn membership 
dues over to the ACLU, the NAACP, or the NRA in part because 
they believe those organizations will be able to use such resources in 
contribution to political discourse more effectively, more clearly, or 
with greater amplification than could the members deploying their 
resources themselves.106 This is good thinking, as the economies of 
scale and specialization of labor attendant to pooled resources will 
undoubtedly allow people with common interests to speak more 
effectively as a group than could be gained by the sum of their 
individual expression.107 It is undoubtedly the case that the ACLU 
from time-to-time supports particular political positions with which 
individual members disagree.108 Members surely anticipate that this 
will be the case when they decide to become members of the group 
but figure that the gains they realize from positions they share with 
the group will more than offset losses associated with the group’s 
advance of positions they oppose.109 Of course, if members get fed-up 
with the ACLU they can quit the organization and stop paying dues, 
although, unlike shareholders in publicly traded corporations, they do 
not have the option of cutting their losses by alienating their shares in 
the enterprise to a willing buyer.110 
 
 105. Id. at 275. 
 106. See id. at 272, 274. 
 107. See id. at 254. 
 108. See id. at 273. 
 109. See id. 
 110. ACLU memberships are not alienable. E-mail from Kitt Abad, Assoc. Manager, 
Member Servs., ACLU, to David G. Yosifon, Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara 
Univ. Sch. of Law (Mar. 2, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see 
Redish & Wasserman, supra note 43, at 274. 
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If one were to compare the ease with which a person can invest 
or divest in a corporation to the opportunity costs involved in, say, 
working a phone bank in support of a candidate for office, it would 
seem that those who manage to get involved in a phone bank are far 
more likely to be contributing a quantum of discourse to overall 
political exchange that is out of proportion to actual support for their 
positions than does corporate speech. It is widely known, for 
example, that retirees have a great deal more time at their disposal 
than do full-time laborers and parents, and so are able to inject their 
views into political discourse in a manner disproportionate to the 
likely actual level of support for such ideas among the electorate. Yet 
few would argue that Congress could ban phone banking by the 
elderly because it distorts political discourse in this way. Even if 
distortion were a legitimate ground on which to base speech 
regulations, then one would still want for a justification for singling 
out corporations for distortion-based regulation. 
3.  The Corruption or Appearance-of-Corruption Argument 
It is illegal for citizens to sell their votes or for politicians to 
peddle their influence.111 The Supreme Court has permitted Congress 
to place limitations on individual campaign contributions as a 
prophylactic against such corruption.112 Such contribution limits are 
applied to both individuals and corporations.113 Whatever one thinks 
of caps on campaign contributions, the corruption justification must 
at some point be limited by a definitional assertion about what counts 
as genuine democracy. For example, if politicians were overtly, 
specifically coordinating policy favors on behalf of third parties in 
connection with those parties’ independent expenditures, then there 
may be a “too cute” justification for looking past the form of 
independent expenditure to the substance of influence peddling. But 
if the government could make it illegal for individuals or groups to 
knock on doors, attend rallies, or print and distribute their own 
handbills in support of a political candidate out of a concern that such 
 
 111. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1324 n.1 
(2000) (cataloging federal and state prohibitions on vote buying). 
 112. For example, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23, 28–29 (1976) (per curiam), allowed 
for limitations on campaign contributions in order to prevent “corruption,” but the 
legislation it allowed did not distinguish between corporate and natural person 
contributions. 
 113. See Chip Nielson & Jason D. Kaune, Overview of Federal Campaign Finance: 
Contribution and Expenditure Limitations, in CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 2008, 
at 13, 30–36 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1689, 2008) 
(summarizing limitations on political contributions by both individuals and corporations). 
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activity would “buy” a politician’s commitment to pass legislation 
favored by such groups or individuals, then it would seem that the 
corruption justification would allow Congress to outlaw democracy 
itself. 
A curious subsidiary version of the prevention of corruption 
argument focuses not on corruption itself but on the “appearance” of 
corruption. The argument here is that even if third-party expenditures 
do not actually corrupt the democratic process, they may nevertheless 
leave citizens with the impression that corruption abounds, which 
may lead people to lose their faith in democracy, which would cause 
them to stop participating in democracy, which would undermine 
democracy.114 The word “cynicism” is sometimes used in connection 
with this justification for regulating third-party expenditures: “Take 
away Congress’ authority to regulate the appearance of undue 
influence and ‘the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune 
could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic 
governance.’ ”115 What is weird and suspicious about this argument is 
that it would purport to allow Congress to regulate the speech of 
some parties because of other people’s misapprehension about the 
meaning and consequence of the speech. The reason that “cynicism” 
is thought to be a vice is because the cynic has an unduly negative 
view of the motives of other people.116 To restrain the speech of some 
parties because of other people’s mistaken belief about the 
 
 114. See Redish & Wasserman, supra note 43, at 264–68, 285–88 (discussing anti-
corruption argument). See generally Marlene Arnold Nicholson, The Constitutionality of 
the Federal Restrictions on Corporate and Union Campaign Contributions and 
Expenditures, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 945, 994–99 (1980) (reviewing corruption and 
appearance-of-corruption arguments for restricting corporate political speech); John S. 
Shockley, Direct Democracy, Campaign Finance, and the Courts: Can Corruption, Undue 
Influence, and Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 377 (1985) 
(same). 
 115. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 963 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. 
Ct. 876 (2010)); id. at 974 (“When citizens turn on their televisions and radios before an 
election and hear only corporate electioneering, they may lose faith in their capacity, as 
citizens, to influence public policy. A Government captured by corporate interests, they 
may come to believe, will be neither responsive to their needs nor willing to give their 
views a fair hearing. The predictable result is cynicism and disenchantment: an increased 
perception that large spenders ‘call the tune’ and a reduced ‘willingness of voters to take 
part in democratic governance.’ ” (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003), 
overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010))). 
 116. See THOMAS HURKA, VIRTUE, VICE, AND VALUE 94 (2001) (“A more subtle 
pure vice is cynicism. A cynic believes the world and people’s lives are less good than they 
are commonly taken to be, and, let us assume, actually are. . . . [The cynic] claims that 
people are less virtuous and more prone to vice than in fact they are.”). 
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consequences of such speech would seem to patronize cynicism, 
rather than ameliorate it. 
In any event, there is nothing in the corruption or appearance-of-
corruption justifications that would legitimate a regulation that 
singles out corporate speech and leaves untouched cynicism-inducing 
speech by other wealthy individuals or groups. 
4.  The Narrow Pursuit of Profit Argument 
Some people117 argue that political speech by for-profit business 
corporations should not enjoy First Amendment protection because 
such speech is calculated only to make profit, not to advance the 
operation of democratic processes, or individual expression and self-
realization, which these same folks view as the central purposes of the 
First Amendment.118 
This justification also cannot withstand scrutiny. A great deal of 
political speech by natural persons is undertaken, at least in part, to 
make a profit. Indeed the profit motive is often the “but-for” cause of 
political speech, in that many authors would not write books or 
articles, or speakers give keynote addresses at conferences, unless 
there was money in it. As Dr. Johnson put it with slight, but not 
constitutionally significant, exaggeration: “No man [or woman] but a 
blockhead ever wrote, except for money.”119 Most politicians above 
the very local level are paid to serve in their posts and thus seek to 
profit from their own political speech. The New York Times, again, is 
a for-profit corporation. 
One might argue that even if profit is a “but-for” cause of much 
speech by political writers and speakers, politicians, and the New 
York Times, it is not the sole motivation. But neither is profit the sole 
motivation of corporate speech. Corporate law requires that 
shareholder profits predominate in the minds of the directors, but it 
does not completely forbid the presence of all other considerations, 
such as regard for the interests of other corporate stakeholders, or 
morality, ethics, and the health of the polity generally.120 Further, the 
 
 117. And by people of course I mean, among others, the late, great First Amendment 
scholar C. Edwin Baker. 
 118. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 196 (1989). 
 119. JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 529 (David Womersley ed., 
Penguin Books 2008) (1791). 
 120. See generally Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 763–76 (2005) (reviewing the latitude that corporate directors enjoy, 
at the margins, to adopt profit-sacrificing corporate policies, including “operational 
restraint” and charitable giving). 
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federal securities laws today provide shareholders with a “proposal” 
mechanism through which they can author, and have put to a 
shareholder vote, proposals for the reform of corporate operations 
that bear on ethical or moral aspects of the firm and which have 
nothing to do with profit.121 The speech of publicly-traded firms, 
therefore, cannot be characterized as exclusively profit-seeking, even 
if it is predominately so. 
In any event, even if all corporate speech were directed at profit-
making, would not the restriction of such speech amount to viewpoint 
discrimination? Many respectable thinkers have argued that the profit 
motive and the pursuit of profit is the surest way of stoking 
individual, communal, and civic flourishing.122 For-profit corporate 
political speech is the embodiment and voice of this view of how 
society gets good. Shareholders who invest in profit-maximizing firms 
presumably embrace the pro-profits discourse in corporate political 
speech acts, and their viewpoints would be discriminated against if 
corporate speech were restricted because of the substance—the pro-
profit orientation—of their speaking agenda. 
Unless one is willing to allow the government to regulate 
individual or non-profit speech because it was wholly or partly 
motivated by a desire to make profits, or because it had only one 
point, then some other principle must be found that would justify the 
regulation of corporate political speech.123 
 
 121. See Yosifon, supra note 2, at 311–12 (discussing the shareholder proposal 
mechanism). 
 122. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 9–10 (Harriman House 2007) 
(1776) (“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.”); see also Martin H. 
Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of 
Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 87 (2007) (“[T]he corporate form can 
be viewed as a type of ‘catalytic self-realization’ that facilitates individuals’ efforts to 
realize both their goals and their potential.”). 
 123. “[T]he difficulty . . . [in] opposing corporate participation in political campaigns is 
. . . how to derive a reasoned distinction for prohibiting the expenditures of business 
corporations but not those of other organized interests.” Romano, supra note 15, at 1000. 
Redish and Wasserman argue that the profit-motive justification for restricting corporate 
political speech cannot be right because “[u]nder well-accepted First Amendment doctrine 
. . . a speaker’s motivation is entirely irrelevant to the question of constitutional 
protection.” Redish & Wasserman, supra note 43, at 269. That is not an entirely accurate 
characterization, given that untruthful speech even about a political figure that is made 
with “malice” on the part of the speaker is unprotected under New York Times v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964), whereas false speech made without malice is protected (so 
long as it is not reckless). Id. I think it suffices to note that the profit motive is not 
considered sufficient justification to limit speech by other actors, partnerships or entities, 
and thus that it does not suffice as a justification to limit corporate speech. 
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5.  The Shareholder Protection Argument 
Some people argue that the state’s interest in protecting 
shareholders justifies state restrictions on corporate political 
speech.124 From a corporate law perspective, this argument makes 
little sense. 
Corporate law presumes that directors, not shareholders, control 
corporate operations and decide how to deploy corporate 
resources.125 Shareholders who disagree with directors on business, 
moral, or political grounds have very few options. They can mount an 
extremely expensive campaign to oust incumbent directors; they can 
mount an extremely-unlikely-to-succeed shareholder proposal 
campaign through the federal securities laws seeking to change 
corporate policy; if they are rich enough, they can buy out the 
company outright; or, as is the usual course for disgruntled 
shareholders, they can sell their stock. Business law typically does not 
micromanage decisions about deploying corporate resources. 
Corporate law typically has no interest in protecting idiosyncratic 
shareholders from having their moral or political ideologies 
undermined by corporate operations. It would be anomalous and 
destructive of the power of directorial authority in firm governance to 
start down that road in connection with political speech. There is 
nothing special about corporate political speech that distinguishes it 
from other opportunities directors have to engage in conduct that 
differs from the social, moral, or political interests of individual 
shareholders. It would be incongruous at best to argue that 
shareholders need no protection against corporate decisions to drill 
for oil in the oceans, distribute pornography, invest in sub-prime 
mortgages, or purchase luxury boxes for professional sporting events, 
but that they need protection against corporate decisions to spend 
money endeavoring to influence the political process that makes rules 
and regulations bearing on the operations and profitability of the 
firm. 
Sometimes this argument is framed as a loyalty problem, with the 
claim being that directors seek to advance their own ideological 
interests through corporate political speech rather than the interests 
of the firm.126 Where directors engage in such disloyal conduct, 
 
 124. See, e.g., Sitkoff, supra note 43, at 1113–23 (reviewing shareholder protection 
arguments for limiting corporate political speech and collecting citations). 
 125. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2001) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”). 
 126. See Sitkoff, supra note 43, at 1113–23. 
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corporate law has a ready remedy through breach of fiduciary duty 
claims.127 That it may sometimes be difficult to distinguish between 
self-aggrandizing and faithful corporate decisions is not a problem 
that is unique to political speech—it is also hard to tell whether luxury 
boxes at ball games are really good for shareholders or just good for 
directors. Still, where directors spend on behalf of candidates who are 
family members or friends, or on behalf of causes that are pet 
projects, especially where such candidacies or projects are wholly 
irrelevant to or at odds with the corporate purpose, then corporate 
law provides a remedy through shareholder derivative suits that put 
the onus on directors to demonstrate that “interested” transactions 
were entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders.128 But the 
going view in mainstream corporate theory is that robust equity 
markets, competitive labor and consumer markets, and social norms 
among directors more or less effectively control such opportunistic 
conduct.129 If directors were able to regularly appropriate corporate 
assets to serve their own, rather than the firm’s, political agenda, then 
we would likely see Delaware, or some state that would like to steal 
away Delaware’s largess in incorporation fees, promulgate an 
incorporation statute that made political speech ultra vires. The fact 
that we do not see such statutes or widespread shareholder 
antagonism for the adoption of similarly restricting bylaws suggests 
that corporate political speech tends to benefit shareholders, not 
harm them. In the wake of Citizens United, some scholars have 
argued that shareholders should be allowed to vote to strip directors 
of the power to spend on politics, or else that the default rule should 
be that directors do not have the power to spend on politics unless 
shareholders affirmatively vote them that power.130 I think it is 
implausible to think that the shareholders of any one firm, or 
shareholders as a class, would be interested in so binding their 
principals’ hands (or tongues, as it were). 
It is worth noting that the disciplining power of highly liquid 
capital markets witnessed in the for-profit corporate world is not 
 
 127. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 10.09, at 202–05 (2d 
ed. 2003) (summarizing corporate directors’ duty of loyalty). 
 128. See id. §§ 10.09–10.12, at 202–15 (reviewing corporate law frameworks for 
enforcing directors’ loyalty obligations). 
 129. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 73–155; see also Romano, supra note 15, at 996 
(“[T]he disciplining power of markets aided by appropriate incentive contracts restrains 
managers from consistently engaging in political activities adverse to shareholder 
interests.”). 
 130. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: 
Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 97–105 (2010). 
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similarly available to constrain the opportunistic conduct of high-
ranking officers of non-profit membership associations, and yet few 
would sanction restricting the political speech of such associations on 
those grounds.131 
6.  The Foreign or Non-Resident Influence Argument 
To the extent that national or sub-national political boundaries 
are legitimate, then it may also be legitimate for national and sub-
national political entities to restrain outsiders from influencing their 
politics or elections. Because publicly-traded corporations may be 
held in part by foreign individuals or foreign corporations, one might 
argue that Congress should be able to restrict corporate political 
speech in order to keep out the influences of such foreign interests. In 
his Citizens United dissent Justice Stevens’ emphasized the foreign-
agent angle: 
Although they make enormous contributions to our society, 
corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot vote 
or run for office. Because they may be managed and controlled 
by nonresidents, their interests may conflict in fundamental 
respects with the interests of eligible voters. . . . Our lawmakers 
have a compelling constitutional basis, if not also a democratic 
duty, to take measures designed to guard against the potentially 
deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and national 
races.132 
The trouble is that if one were to embrace this position, there is 
again nothing in the argument that distinguishes corporations from 
other associations. The Catholic Church, for example, and the Anti-
Defamation League, both receive funding from foreign sources, with 
literally universal agendas, and both participate broadly in American 
political discourse. What’s sound regulatory sauce for the 
international corporate goose is sound regulatory sauce for the 
international associational gander. 
Further, if one takes a very broad view of listener interests in 
political speech, then it is hard to see what legitimate interest 
governments could have in restricting foreign speech. If more speech 
 
 131. See Nicole Gilkeson, For-Profit Scandal in the Nonprofit World: Should States 
Force Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions onto Nonprofit Corporations?, 95 GEO. L.J. 831, 832 
(2007) (reviewing widespread problem of disloyal agency in non-profit associations). 
 132. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 930 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring and 
dissenting); see also id. at 947 (“Although we have not reviewed them directly, we have 
never cast doubt on laws that place special restrictions on campaign spending by foreign 
nationals. See, e.g., 2 U. S. C. §441e(a)(1).”). 
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is always valuable to listeners, then citizens should simply be able to 
hear speech from foreign persons, groups, or countries, discount such 
speech as appropriate considering the foreigner’s foreign interests, 
and go about forming their own opinions within the marketplace of 
ideas. 
C. Sound-But-Ultimately-Scary Arguments for Regulating Corporate 
Speech 
While none of the arguments so far analyzed seem to this author 
to stand up to scrutiny, there is at least one argument for restricting 
political speech which I believe is sound and unavoidable. The 
argument is inescapable, but it is also frightful in its implications. 
Humans are finite creatures. We have limited cognitive capacity 
and a limited time on earth.133 We can only take in and make sense of 
a limited amount of stimuli around us.134 We are vulnerable to drown-
out and overwhelmance if one speaker or group of speakers can 
dominate a discursive space or time for speaking and listening.135 The 
First Amendment was made for humanity, not humanity for the First 
Amendment.136 The point (or points) of the First Amendment is to 
enable individual and group expression and to engender the robust 
production and circulation of ideas that are useful to people generally 
and to the well-functioning of a free and democratic society in 
particular. Given the scarcity of the human condition, our limited 
faculties and time, these interests can only be served if speech can be 
restricted so that some speakers cannot drown out other speakers and 
overwhelm listeners. 
While most of his long dissent in Citizens United is focused on 
the kinds of arguments dismissed in the previous sub-sections, Justice 
Stevens is on his firmest footing when he finally turns late in his 
opinion to the predicament of human scarcity: “All of the majority’s 
theoretical arguments turn on a proposition with undeniable surface 
appeal but little grounding in evidence or experience, ‘that there is no 
such thing as too much speech.’ ”137 He drops a footnote: “Of course, 
 
 133. See generally Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 9 (analyzing the implications of 
human cognitive limitations for legal theory and policymaking). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. With apologies to Mark 2:27 (“The Sabbath was made for humanity, not humanity 
for the Sabbath.”). 
 137. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 975 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting 
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 695 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). 
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no presiding person in a courtroom, legislature, classroom, polling 
place, or family dinner would take this hyperbole literally.”138 His text 
then continues: 
If individuals in our society had infinite free time to listen to 
and contemplate every last bit of speech uttered by anyone, 
anywhere; . . . then I suppose the majority’s premise would be 
sound. In the real world, we have seen, corporate domination of 
the airwaves prior to an election may decrease the average 
listener’s exposure to relevant viewpoints, and it may diminish 
citizens’ willingness and capacity to participate in the 
democratic process.139 
First Amendment law in a few narrow places is responsive to the 
problem of scarcity and drown-out. For example, the Court allows 
states to limit ballot access to candidates with a bona fide chance of 
winning an election and allows state-run television to broadcast 
campaign debates that allow only candidates with substantial support 
to take the stage.140 First Amendment theory in general, however, 
does not yet have a cogent response to the drown-out, 
overwhelmance, or human limitations argument.141 A coherent theory 
of free speech must recognize that the analytic escape hatch of solving 
all speech-related problems with appeals to “more speech” ultimately 
leads to a dead end.142 
Our concept of free speech cannot rest on unreliable fantasies 
about what kind of species we are. Professor Redish has argued, 
unpersuasively, that 
 
 138. Id. at n.74. 
 139. Id. at 975–76. 
 140. Justice Stevens emphasizes these cases in his Citizens United dissent. See id. at 946 
(citing Ark. Ed. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (upholding restrictions 
allowed on televised debates); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding 
restrictions on electioneering near polling stations)). The Court has also limited speech 
where the listeners or readers are unable to easily avoid the speech. See Rowan v. U.S. 
Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (“[N]o one has a right to press even ‘good’ 
ideas on an unwilling recipient.”). 
 141. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (“I have taken the view that a legislature may 
place reasonable restrictions on individuals’ electioneering expenditures in the service of 
the governmental interests explained above [which may be read to include drown-out 
problems], and in recognition of the fact that such restrictions are not direct restraints on 
speech but rather on its financing. See, e.g., Randall [v. Sorrell], 548 U.S., at 273 [2006] 
(dissenting opinion).”). 
 142. The Citizens United majority offers blithe abstractions but never confronts directly 
the real problem of drown-out: “Factions should be checked by permitting them all to 
speak and by entrusting the people to judge what is true and what is false.” Id. at 907 
(majority opinion). “[I]t is our law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the 
governing rule.” Id. at 911. 
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[o]ne cannot construe the First Amendment to allow the 
government conclusively to determine either how citizens 
process information or when the fear of an information 
overload dictates a need for governmental intervention. Society 
can never be sure that such a point ever exists, much less that 
citizens have, in fact, reached it. The commitment to the free 
speech concept clearly implies that too much information—if, 
indeed, there could ever be such a thing—always is preferable 
to too little.143 
Redish asserts that the First Amendment cannot countenance 
government adopting a specific view of human information 
processing.144 His position, however, requires us to adopt a view of 
humanity that is not only specific but false, and that is a view of 
humans as capable of processing any amount of speech. To establish a 
coherent and defensible theory of free speech, theorists must begin in 
precisely the place that Redish considers off-limits: a realistic 
conception of the human mind.145 
The drown-out justification is a sound and necessary basis for 
regulating political speech, but its implications are troubling. While 
we do know as a biological fact that humans can only process so much 
speech, how to quantify the limit or the latitude that government 
should be entitled to in regulating on the basis of that limit is 
extremely difficult to figure. Moreover, if we are to take this 
justification seriously we must look beyond the quantum of speech 
and also consider its persuasiveness. If an articulate speaker can 
occupy as much of a listener’s imagination with 100 words as an 
inarticulate speaker could with 1000 words, should then government 
be entitled to, on the basis of the drown-out justification, limit the 
articulate speaker to 100 words while providing the inarticulate 
speaker 1000 words? And there is the question of making space in the 
discursive arena for highly marginal ideas or speakers. Given our 
cognitive limitations, should Congress be permitted to restrain the 
speech of those proponing widely held views in order to make time 
and space available for new or obscure perspectives? These are 
challenging, scary questions, but we will not have a complete or 
coherent policy of free speech until we are able to answer it. 
This Article does not endeavor to solve this problem. It rests 
instead on the simpler provisional conclusions that drown-out, while a 
 
 143. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 43, at 290. 
 144. Id. at 290–91. 
 145. See David G. Yosifon, Resisting Deep Capture: The Commercial Speech Doctrine 
and Junk-Food Advertising to Children, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 507, 599–601 (2006). 
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good reason to limit speech generally, is not a sufficient reason to 
limit corporate speech in particular. After all, many individuals in our 
society are wealthier than many corporations and can drown out the 
speech not only of other natural persons, but of small, poor 
corporations as well.146 
D. Practical Impediments to Regulating Corporate Speech 
Even if one could come up with a normative justification for why 
corporate speech should be subject to greater government restriction 
than other associational speech, and even if the Supreme Court were 
to sanction such a view under the First Amendment, it would still 
remain practically impossible to restrict corporate speech in a manner 
that would solve the public choice problem in the shareholder 
primacy theory of corporate law. 
If regulation of campaign donations and expenditures were 
allowed, there would still be myriad ways corporations could 
influence the political process that would prove even more difficult to 
regulate. For example, suppose a corporation, forbidden from making 
any direct campaign contributions or expenditures, decided that it 
was going to increase the salary of its top management by exactly the 
amount of money that it would have spent on political campaigns, and 
that management donated or expended such money on political 
campaigns they thought would benefit their firms. Suppose this was 
the practice among all corporations in a particular industry and that 
the market for corporate management came to efficiently price wages 
in terms of the political contributions that they made. Surely it would 
not be permissible for the government to regulate the private 
campaign expenditures of corporate managers, unless we are going to 
permit a much broader kind of political speech regulation in our 
society. 
The foregoing analysis makes clear that what is at issue in 
Citizens United is not really the disproportionate or corrosive 
 
 146. In Bellotti the Court rejected Massachusetts’ argument that corporate spending 
threatened to “drown out” other speech on referenda, concluding that such a concern was 
purely speculative, unsupported by empirical findings. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765, 789–90 (1978). While Bellotti could in this sense be read to mean that the 
government may regulate on a drown-out theory if it can prove drown-out empirically, 
nothing in such a principle would distinguish corporate drown-out from drown-out by 
other kinds of speakers. In any event, it seems unlikely that, even with evidence, Bellotti-
type legislation could be sustained under a drown-out theory, given the Court’s statement 
elsewhere in the case that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some 
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to 
the First Amendment.” Id. 
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influence of corporations as compared to natural persons in our 
politics, but rather the disproportionate influence of wealthy and 
powerful natural persons over the relatively poor and powerless in 
our politics. Focusing on the limited viability of justifications for 
limiting corporate speech reveals that talking about the power of 
corporations has obfuscated the much more profound problem that is 
at the heart of motivations for limiting corporate speech: the desire 
for equality and justice in the political domain. Political efforts to 
restrain corporate speech are really efforts to restrain a powerful 
interest group in order to allow other interest groups to have more 
influence in government. Because the Supreme Court has told us that 
we cannot keep corporations out of our democracy, then the next best 
way to accomplish the goals motivating such legislation is to bring 
more democracy into our corporations. 
III.  SOLVING THE PUBLIC CHOICE PROBLEM IN CORPORATE LAW 
One of the strange things about Justice Stevens’ dissent in 
Citizens United, and widespread political and popular opposition to 
the case, is the implicit assumption that the only thing Congress can 
do to protect democracy from being undermined by corporate power 
is to stop corporate political activity. This is plainly not the case. If the 
problem is that corporations are too powerful, Congress has a 
number of avenues available to it other than speech regulation to 
solve that problem. Congress could forbid corporations altogether. Or 
Congress could forbid those elements of the corporate nexus that 
make them powerful—for example, the separation of ownership and 
control. Or Congress could tax corporate operations until capital, 
labor, and consumers prefer to deal with each other in small 
partnerships rather than make use of the onerous corporate form. 
The problem with such corporation-weakening responses to the 
public choice problem in corporate law is that we would lose the great 
efficiencies—the economies of scale that create new jobs and better 
products—that corporate organization provides. This kind of 
approach to the problem of corporate political speech would be 
slitting the throat of the golden goose; it would silence its 
troublesome political squawks to be sure, but at the cost of losing its 
socially useful golden eggs. Far better, I will argue in this Part, to 
retain (switching metaphors) the promising baby of the corporate 
form, but to drain away the polluting bathwater of the shareholder 
primacy norm in corporate governance, replacing it with the 
enlivening wash of stakeholder-oriented governance. 
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If we cannot rely on contract or external regulation to protect the 
interests of non-shareholders, then shareholder primacy must be 
altered in favor of a system that requires corporate directors to attend 
to the interests of non-shareholding stakeholders at the level of firm 
governance. When we say presently that directors are “fiduciaries” of 
shareholders we mean, in the words of Easterbrook and Fischel, that 
directors must “work hard and honestly”147 to advance shareholder 
interests. To make directors fiduciaries of workers and consumers, 
then, would be to say that because contract is insufficient to protect 
consumer interests and because the backstop of government 
regulation is implausible under shareholder primacy, directors must 
consider it their duty to “work hard and honestly” not only to 
advance shareholder interests, but worker and consumer interests as 
well. 
Corporate law has nothing substantive to say about what 
constitutes “work[ing] hard and honestly.”148 The business judgment 
rule provides directors with complete discretion to determine what 
kinds of business operations are in the best interests of their 
principals.149 While unrepentantly agnostic on substance, however, 
corporate law is much more confident enforcing procedural 
obligations on fiduciaries.150 In order to gain the protective cover of 
the business judgment rule, directors must be informed, and they 
must deliberate.151 Satisfying this obligation may take different forms 
in different circumstances, from reading reports, to hearing 
presentations, to engaging in discussion and debate. To require 
directors to attend as fiduciaries to the interests of workers and 
consumers at the level of firm governance would thus also provide 
workers and consumers with the benefits of the process obligation. 
This obligation constitutes a discursive occasion in which multiple-
stakeholder interests and vulnerabilities implicated in particular 
corporate decisions, or broad corporate strategies, would be voiced, 
heard, and considered.152 
 
 147. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 91. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 127, § 10.01, at 184–86 (summarizing the business 
judgment rule). 
 150. Id. at 185. 
 151. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985) (explicating this 
process obligation). 
 152. For further examination of how multi-stakeholder governance might be 
operationalized on the board of directors, see David G. Yosifon, Discourse Norms As 
Default Rules: Structuring Corporate Speech to Multiple Stakeholders, 21 HEALTH 
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Multi-stakeholder governance will help to solve the public choice 
problem inherent in the shareholder primacy system, a problem that 
will only be exacerbated after Citizens United. Under shareholder 
primacy, directors have the incentive and the opportunity to 
appropriate value from workers and consumers on behalf of 
shareholders. Under a stakeholderist corporate governance regime, 
directors are restrained by the golden yoke of fiduciary obligation 
from engaging in the kind of exploitation of non-shareholders that is 
impelled by the current system. Thus, under a multi-stakeholder 
regime, non-shareholders have less need for external government 
regulation because they are receiving greater attention within firm 
governance. Further, to the extent that corporations continue to 
engage in political activity under a multi-stakeholder system, they will 
do so on behalf of numerous stakeholders, rather than for 
shareholders alone. 
Multiple stakeholder governance would have to be implemented 
by statutory reform. Some readers of drafts of this Article and related 
work have suggested that the same public choice problems that I 
emphasize in critiquing the social utility of shareholder primacy norm 
would also preclude the implementation of the multi-stakeholder 
regime that I advocate, given that shareholders would prefer the 
status quo and shareholder primacy corporations would work to 
maintain it. I have two basic responses. First, this Article is primarily 
concerned with assessing the coherence of corporate theory. My 
argument is that shareholder primacy is not viable unless one is 
prepared to allow government to restrict corporate political activity, 
which I argue would be unprincipled, unwise, and, according to the 
Supreme Court, unconstitutional. Multi-stakeholder governance, on 
the other hand, is coherent without requiring restrictions on 
corporate political activity. So if you were trying to decide, from the 
proverbial original position behind the “veil of ignorance,”153 whether 
to start a society with either shareholder primacy or multiple-
stakeholder firms, then you would choose the latter. 
Second, from a more practical perspective, political theorists 
argue that ordinary public choice dynamics are altered in times of 
heighted political sensitivity or activity. When a public policy issue 
becomes highly salient, dispersed groups with diverse interests can for 
 
MATRIX (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 27–34) (on file with the North Carolina Law 
Review). 
 153. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10–15 (rev. ed. 1999) (arguing that legal 
rules should be developed from behind a hypothetical veil of ignorance in which one does 
not know the class position or set of individual skills that one would have in the regime). 
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a hot moment come together to overcome the advantages that 
smaller, more focused groups typically enjoy in the competition for 
regulatory favor.154 The somewhat dramatic kind of corporate 
governance reform that I am exploring could be implemented in such 
a moment. The purpose of this Article is to make the case that this 
kind of change is worth pursuing when that kind of occasion emerges. 
Hot political moments also would present the possibility of 
developing more robust external regulation favoring workers, 
consumers, or communities, but once there is a return to politics as 
usual, then shareholder primacy firms’ collective action advantage re-
emerges to once again undermine and evade such external regulation. 
That pernicious dynamic is curbed when the hot political moment is 
instead used to implement basic and desirable changes to the internal 
structure of corporate governance. 
A. Institutionalizing Multi-Stakeholder Corporate Governance 
1.  Conventional Account of Why Multi-Stakeholder Governance 
Cannot Work 
This Part explores the plausibility of formalizing and 
institutionalizing multi-stakeholder corporate governance. Most 
corporate law scholars believe that shareholder primacy in firm 
governance is in the best interest of all corporate stakeholders, and 
therefore few find it necessary to reach the question of the feasibility 
of a multi-stakeholder regime.155 When shareholder primacists do 
examine the plausibility of multi-fiduciarism, they conclude that it is 
not operationally plausible.156 
A multi-stakeholder regime could conceivably be structured on a 
corporate board of directors through either an “unclassified” or a 
“classified” form. In an unclassified system each director would be 
 
 154. See, e.g., James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 
DUKE L.J. 625, 675 (2007) (“Many commentators have observed that there is a 
relationship between the business cycle and the production of securities regulation. During 
boom times, industry has more influence, there is less public demand for regulation, 
regulators tend to be more cautious, and less new regulation is produced. Busts tend to 
reveal scandals that cause public outrage, reducing industry influence, emboldening 
regulators, and leading to the passage of more restrictive laws. An example of such a law is 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which Congress passed in response to public pressure after the 
collapse of Enron. These arguments can be seen as a form of public choice theory, which 
has long been an influential framework for explaining the production of regulation.” 
(citing, inter alia, Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of United 
States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 1 (2002))). 
 155. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 38. 
 156. Id. 
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responsible for attending to the interests of multiple stakeholders. 
According to conventional accounts, an unclassified multi-
stakeholder regime is impossible because a director asked to serve 
more than one master has been “freed of both and is answerable to 
neither.”157 Such a director, shareholder primacists insist, can pursue 
her own interests rather than her principals’ because she can always 
rebuff any stakeholder complaint of directorial malfeasance by 
arguing that the conduct was meant to advance the interests of some 
other stakeholder, and thus was in accord with the directors’ duties.158 
Shareholder primacists further insist that even the loyal multi-
stakeholder director would be forever paralyzed, never knowing 
whether to privilege the interests of one as opposed to another 
stakeholder in a given corporate decision or set of decisions.159 
The other way to structure a multi-stakeholder regime would be 
through a classified board in which individual directors would be 
charged with representing the interests of particular stakeholders—a 
director for shareholders, a director for workers, one for consumers, 
etc. While the two-masters problem might be mitigated with such an 
approach, critics insist that a classified multi-stakeholder board would 
result in disastrously cacophonous dynamics on a decision-making 
body that requires cooperation.160 A classified board would result in 
“gangsterism” in which each director tries to maximize return to his 
own charges at the expense of the other groups, and of the enterprise 
as a whole.161 
In light of the market manipulation and public choice problems 
analyzed above, these conventional arguments against multi-
fiduciarism must be re-examined. I have argued that the public choice 
problem in corporate law is caused in part by the strength of the 
corporate organizational form. In what follows I will again focus on 
the power of corporate design, this time to argue that multi-
fiduciarism in firm governance is more plausible than its critics have 
presumed. I argue that the true “genius”162 of our corporate law lies in 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 37–39. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See, e.g., Alfred F. Conrad, Reflections on Public Interest Directors, 75 MICH. L. 
REV. 941, 950 (1977) (“To most executives, the vision of a board of directors composed of 
advocates of competing objectives would be a nightmare.”). 
 161. Beardsley Ruml, Corporate Managers As a Locus of Power, in 3 SOCIAL 
MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS: THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF CORPORATE 
MANAGEMENT 219, 234 (Edmond N. Cahn ed., 1950). 
 162. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW, at ix (1993) 
(celebrating the “genius” of American corporate law). 
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its hierarchical decision-making structure, not in its singular 
governance maxim, and that this structure can be deployed to 
ameliorate the purported problems with an unclassified multi-
stakeholder governance regime. 
2.  The Essential Submission to Board Dominance 
Corporations are associations of numerous individuals and 
groups, all of whom stand to gain from trading among what each of 
them brings to the table—capital, labor, credit, and consumption. Left 
to their own devices, these stakeholders would encounter huge costs 
in trying to effectively coordinate their contributions and huge costs 
in fighting over the gains to the trades in which they engage. The 
brilliance of the corporate board of directors is that it imposes a rule 
by fiat that cheaply overcomes these potentially paralyzing problems 
of coordination and rent-seeking. Professor Bainbridge argues that 
the real beauty of American corporate law is this decision-making 
mechanism that it provides to help overcome coordination and 
distribution problems: “The chief economic virtue of the public 
corporation is not that it permits the aggregation of large capital 
pools, but rather that it provides a hierarchical decision-making 
structure well-suited to the problem of operating a large business 
enterprise with numerous employees, managers, shareholders, 
creditors, and other inputs.”163 
In corporate law the board is final not because it is infallible; it is 
final because finality is an enormously effective mechanism for 
achieving social organization.164 To give any person, group, or 
institution the power or authority to review the substance of board 
decisions would be to replace the board with such a person, group, or 
institution, which would itself need to be given final authority, or 
would have to be reviewable in still some other way.165 Given that 
some group must have final authority, and since corporate directors 
are likely to make better business decisions than are jurists, 
administrative agencies, or legislatures, it is better to make the board 
itself the final arbiters of what is in the firm’s best interest.166 
Of course fiat could be more cheaply and decisively 
accomplished by a single authoritarian executive than by a board of 
 
 163. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 233. 
 164. Id. at 42. 
 165. Bainbridge is informed by the logic of “collective action,” as espoused by Kenneth 
Arrow and the teachings of contemporary economics and social science. See id. at 46–47, 
56–57. 
 166. See id. 
YOSIFON.PTD2 5/24/2011  8:35 AM 
2011] CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 1241 
 
directors. If just one person were in charge of the corporation, it 
would be easier to reward accomplishment and punish failure.167 
Bainbridge argues that corporate law sacrifices the simplicity and 
certainty of despotism in order to take advantage of the greater 
performance that group decision-making by boards can provide.168 
Although individuals perform better than groups when working on 
creative endeavors, groups outperform even their strongest individual 
members when engaging in evaluative judgment and problem-solving, 
which is the kind of work that boards undertake.169 Having a board of 
directors multiplies the number of backgrounds, perspectives, and 
connections that can be brought to bear on behalf of the corporate 
enterprise. Finally, and crucially, the board provides a “cloud of 
witnesses” for the behavior of each individual board member.170 
Knowing that their fellow board members are watching keeps each 
director working hard, honestly, and in conformance with widely 
shared moral and ethical standards.171 
Bainbridge’s “director primacy” theory presupposes that the 
shareholders on whose behalf the firm is managed will have divergent 
interests.172 For instance, the “interests of large and small investors 
 
 167. Bainbridge emphasizes the problem of “social loafing.” Id. at 81. When people 
working in groups know that it will be difficult for those evaluating the group to 
distinguish the contributions of individual members, then individual group members tend 
to put in less effort than they do if working, and being observed, alone. Id. Bainbridge 
cites to social science demonstrating this effect. Id. The explanation for this effect is that in 
group-work conditions people selfishly believe they can free-ride on the efforts of others; 
they also know rationally that if they put in greater efforts than their cohort they will not 
be rewarded for their efforts, which will be attributed to the group. Id. 
 168. Id. at 77–104. 
 169. Id. at 89–94, 101–03. 
 170. Id. at 102. 
 171. Id. at 101–03. 
 172. There is some terminological messiness in corporate law scholarship that could 
bear tidying up. The term “shareholder primacy” is sometimes used to refer to the 
principle purpose of corporate governance, i.e., “shareholder primacy” as the 
maximization of shareholder value, but at other times “shareholder primacy” is used with 
reference to the very different issue of the mechanics of corporate governance, i.e., 
“shareholder primacy” as a mode of organization that embraces significant shareholder 
influence in corporate operations. See id. at 53–57. Bainbridge refers to his own theory of 
corporate governance as “directory primacy” because it privileges the importance of 
directorial discretion and marginalizes the potential for shareholder interference in board 
decision-making. Id. at 233–35. But his “director primacy” in organization still embraces 
“shareholder primacy” as its governance goal. Id. Because there is more widespread 
agreement in mainstream scholarship on corporate purpose than governance design, I use 
the term “shareholder primacy” to refer to corporate purpose. Because Bainbridge’s work 
on “director primacy” is so influential I use his term “director primacy” to refer to the 
structural claim that directors should dominate the governance of the firm. But I prefer to 
call the view that shareholders should be heavily involved in firm governance 
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often differ.”173 Additional divergence is seen between shareholders 
who are highly diversified (and want risk-preferring activity) and 
those who are not (and would prefer more risk-averse strategies), and 
between shareholders who need short-term gains (like the elderly or 
sick) and those who are seeking long-term profitability (like the 
young and healthy).174 Rent-seeking by these disharmonious 
shareholders would undermine the efficiency of corporate operations, 
decreasing the size of the pie that would otherwise be available for all 
to share. Because of their divergent interests, Bainbridge argues, 
shareholders cannot be given substantial influence in corporate 
governance; instead the insulated, collegial body that is the board of 
directors must be given the authority to run the firm as they see fit.175 
Directors do not pursue the interest of large shareholders over small, 
or small over large, or short-term over long-term, or the reverse, but 
rather directors balance the interests of these groups with the hopes 
of assuring that they are all reasonably satisfied, such that the 
corporation may successfully carry on its socially useful operations. 
Bainbridge’s arguments for the institutional competency of the 
independent corporate board are so rich that they reveal the poverty 
of his and other scholars’ arguments against the plausibility of multi-
stakeholder obligation in firm governance. Taking the prospect of 
employee representation as his foil, Bainbridge goes after multi-
fiduciarism with a logician’s precision: “[F]or consensus to function 
. . . two conditions must be met: equivalent interests and information. 
Neither condition can be met when both employee and shareholder 
 
“shareholderism,” or shareholder democracy, rather than the unnecessarily confusing 
“shareholder primacy.” This Article rejects shareholder primacy as a goal and argues that 
a multi-stakeholder regime can be empowered through director primacy in firm 
governance. 
 173. Id. at 228. 
 174. Other than solving dual class dilemmas in favor of “common stock” interests, the 
Delaware courts have ducked the other conflicts between shareholders, though at times it 
has been heard to mumble about the obligation to pursue “the long-run interests of the 
shareholders.” Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986). Courts do not 
appear to be serious about the “long-term” proposition, citing the board’s discretion about 
when to pay dividends as the essence of the directors’ exclusive prerogatives, for example. 
See, e.g., Kamin v. Am. Express, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810–12 (Sup. Ct.) (providing 
touchstone statement of the broad protections provided to the board of directors under 
the business judgment rule), aff’d, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976). See generally 
Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 
75 (2004) (cataloging conflicts faced by directors and analyzing court treatment of conflicts 
between the duty of loyalty and the duty of care across stakeholders and finding the 
loyalty obligations are privileged in such conflicts). 
 175. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 37–44, 53–57. 
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representatives are on the board.”176 But this argument contradicts his 
initial claim that the board is necessary because shareholders do not 
have “equivalent interests”—some are seeking long-term gains, 
others short-term gains, some are diversified, others are not. 
Bainbridge never doubts that directors, freed from the narrow 
interests of specific groups of shareholders, will be able to balance 
their interests in the boardroom.177 This is the same dynamic that 
would be realized under a multi-stakeholder system. It turns out that 
a person, or a board, may serve more than one master, as long as the 
masters cannot second guess or meddle in the servant’s decision. Thus 
does the strength of Bainbridge’s director primacy position 
undermine his opposition to multi-fiduciarism in board governance. 
This argument illustrates both that board independence makes 
multi-fiduciarism possible, and that board independence is necessary 
in order for multi-fiduciarism to work. Progressive scholars have 
tended to advocate greater stakeholder involvement in corporate 
governance, but the present analysis emphasizes that it is director 
primacy that makes multi-fiduciarism possible.178 
Finally, it is not true, as shareholder primacists claim, that a 
multi-stakeholder regime necessarily frees the director to pursue her 
own interests at the corporate expense. As Bainbridge and others 
make clear, capital, labor, and product markets; duty of loyalty 
claims;179 and norms, ethics, and values all operate to constrain 
directorial self-interest.180 Indeed, Bainbridge is so committed to 
director primacy that he insists that directors must have broad 
authority even to develop “poison pills” and other structural defenses 
that can repel hostile takeovers.181 Many legal economists believe that 
a robust market for control is necessary to keep directors working 
hard and honestly for fear that some corporate raider will see that 
there is money to be made by acquiring under-performing firms and 
replacing malingering directors.182 Bainbridge fears that forbidding 
 
 176. Id. at 46; see id. at 47–49. 
 177. See id. at 82–104. 
 178. See generally PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) 
(collecting seminal stakeholderist scholarship). 
 179. The business judgment rule precludes judicial review of the prudence of ordinary 
business decisions, but where self-interest is implicated, directors bear the burden of 
proving to a jurist that a challenged transaction was entirely fair to the firm. See Bayer v. 
Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (providing classic statement of the analytic 
framework applicable to duty of loyalty claims). 
 180. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 100–04, 160–75. 
 181. Id. at 134–54. 
 182. See generally, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of 
a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) 
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directors from developing structural defenses invites a crack in the 
armor of director primacy that will only result in harmful second-
guessing of more and more decision-making by incompetent judges 
and shareholders.183 The Delaware courts are largely in accord with 
Bainbridge, as directors are indeed given substantial latitude even 
when erecting defenses to hostile takeovers.184 This leaves the market 
for control relatively limp and puts ever greater reliance on the power 
of ethics, norms, and honor to keep directors working hard and 
honest. If these mechanisms are sufficient to keep directors honest 
under shareholder primacy, then they should be equally sufficient to 
keep them honest under a stakeholderist regime.185 
 
(emphasizing the disciplining power that a robust market for control exerts on incumbent 
management teams and arguing that allowing incumbent boards to erect structural 
defenses to hostile takeovers undermines such disciplining power). 
 183. For example, suppose directors of a firm rich with real assets started selling off 
those assets and paying high dividends to shareholders. To some this might seem like an 
ordinary business decision, protected from scrutiny by the business judgment rule. Others, 
however, might interpret such a move as a kind of a “structural defense” designed to make 
the firm look less attractive to raiders. If courts or shareholders were empowered to 
review such decisions on the grounds that directors were obstructing the market for 
control, then virtually any decision by directors could be subject to review on such 
grounds, thus destroying the power of director primacy. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 
149–52. 
 184. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154–55 (Del. 
1994) (board may erect structural defenses to hostile tender offer that is not structurally 
coercive in order to vindicate incumbent board’s long-term vision for the company); 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (applying “enhanced 
business judgment” rule to defenses adopted by incumbent board and allowing board to 
adopt structural defense against structurally coercive hostile tender offer which offered 
shareholders substantial premium over market price); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., The 
Professional Bear Hug: The ESB Proposal As a Conscious Effort to Make the Delaware 
Courts Confront the Basic “Just Say No” Question, 55 STAN. L. REV. 863, 864 (2002) 
(arguing that on the question of structural defenses, Delaware “has displayed a studied 
ambivalence . . . recognizing the need for heightened scrutiny when boards use pills, but 
hesitating to override the judgment of independent directors to block acquisition offers”). 
 185. One way corporate practice aligns shareholder and directorial incentives is to pay 
directors partly in salary and partly in the firm’s stock, or to require them to purchase a 
substantial stake in the firm. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 167–70. Such practices have 
been correlated with better corporate performance. Id. at 170. This ties directors’ interests 
both with those of workers and those of shareholders. A similar association could be 
accomplished by requiring corporate directors also to maintain some consumption stake in 
the firm. Another step in this direction would be to require directors either to live or to 
spend significant parts of the year living in a community in which the firm’s operations 
have disproportionate impact. 
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3.  The Limits of Submission: Consumer Participation in Firm 
Governance 
Stakeholder voting has a limited role to play in corporate 
governance. “While notions of shareholder democracy permit 
powerful rhetoric, corporations are not New England town meetings. 
Put another way, we need not value corporate democracy simply 
because we value political democracy.”186 But neither must we 
entirely give up on democracy where the model of the New England 
town meeting would not work. In contemporary society, democratic 
values are realized in myriad ways more modern and manageable 
than the romantic or stylized idea of the town meeting. Because of the 
collective action problems that make it useful for activity to be 
organized through firms to begin with, it is certainly true that 
stakeholder voting must be, as Bainbridge argues with respect to 
shareholder suffrage, “not an integral aspect of the corporate 
decision-making structure, but rather an accountability device of last 
resort to be used sparingly, at best.”187 Similarly, board dominance in 
a multi-fiduciary regime does not necessarily mean that there should 
be no involvement by stakeholders in the selection of the board. 
Limited participation of multiple stakeholders in corporate elections 
may be needed to give teeth to the stakeholder governance regime, 
just as some limited voting by shareholders is presently needed to 
supply some accountability to the shareholder primacy norm. 
The mechanics of extending corporate suffrage would be 
complicated, but not insurmountable. When shareholders buy stock 
they get a claim on residual profits and a vote proportionate to their 
equity stake in the firm. Employees presently receive in exchange for 
their labor a mix of salary, working conditions, and benefits. To these 
might be added a proportion of votes in corporate elections. When 
consumers turn over their cash to the firm they receive corporate 
goods with varying attributes, sometimes including warranties or 
ongoing service. The consumer might also gain with her purchase a 
quantum of voting rights in corporate operations. Many corporate 
consumers today have membership codes or identification numbers 
which track their purchases and calculate “miles” or “points” that can 
 
 186. Id. at 143. Indeed, as Bainbridge describes, not entirely tongue-in-cheek, “[b]oard 
of director elections usually look a lot like old Soviet elections—there is only one slate of 
candidates and the authorities know how each voter voted.” Id. at 180. 
 187. Id. at 235. 
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be exchanged for prizes or rebates.188 The same technology could be 
deployed to tally the accumulation of voting rights with frequent 
purchases. These groups might elect their own directors—workers 
voting for worker directors, consumers for consumer directors, etc. 
But a better approach would undoubtedly be for each of the groups 
to elect directors who would then be obliged to serve all corporate 
stakeholders in unclassified fashion, as the unclassified form would 
seem better placed to exploit the authoritative latitude of the 
directory primacy model of firm governance.189 
The fact that markets are international, but politics local, means 
that when contract is insufficient to safeguard work and consumer 
interests those groups must presently appeal to national or sub-
national governments for redress of grievances relating to 
international corporate operations. Allowing these groups meaningful 
participation in corporate governance would provide important, 
perhaps the only, access that ordinary people have to actively 
participate in international politics.190 International firms are already 
subject to international governance through shareholder suffrage, so 
adding workers and consumers into the mix would only alter the line-
drawing among stakeholders where national political boundaries have 
already been breached. 
CONCLUSION 
In American history, corporations have, in their better uses, 
advanced both individual liberty and social organization. The colonial 
corporations of the seventeenth and eighteenth century provided a 
mechanism through which communities thrived in the New World, 
where individuals could never have made it alone.191 In the nineteenth 
century, Jacksonians demanded the widespread availability of the 
corporate form in order to crush monopoly and democratize 
 
 188. See generally Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Economics of Loyalty Discounts and 
Antitrust Law in the United States, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2005, at 115 
(summarizing widespread use of consumer loyalty programs in retail markets). 
 189. See Yosifon, supra note 2, at 302–12 (exploring the mechanics of expanding 
corporate voting). 
 190. See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction 
and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 599 (2004) (discussing 
Ann-Marie Slaughter’s historical account claiming that the progenitors of international 
trade-liberalizing legislation initially expected the development of international political 
organs to help manage the new economic landscape that their reforms would bring forth). 
 191. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT 
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 17 (2003) (noting that Massachusetts and Virginia 
both came into being as chartered corporations). 
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economic opportunity and its attendant political advantage.192 The 
twentieth century saw the expansion of corporate democracy through 
the development of robust and fluid capital markets and the 
emergence of institutional shareholders. The strength of these 
developments, even while advancing individual and collective well-
being, have eclipsed other institutions traditionally devoted to 
safeguarding human flourishing, including families, communities, 
voluntary associations, and government.193 Corporate law’s task in the 
twenty-first century must be the expansion of corporate governance 
concerns and the corporate franchise to all corporate stakeholders 
who, after Citizens United, can no longer rely exclusively on external 
regulatory institutions to safeguard their interests, but must instead 
look to the corporation—an association in which, our best corporate 
theory informs us, they are already essential participants. 
 
 
 192. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 2 
(1991) (“The modern business corporation had its origin in the general corporation acts 
[of the Jacksonian era], one of the most important legal accomplishments of a regime bent 
on democratizing and deregulating American business.”). 
 193. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 451–53 (reviewing expansion of 
equity holding class in the twentieth century). 
